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INTRODUCTION
Cost-benefit analysis is the most important policy evaluation technique now
used in American public sector decision-making.1 This approach is claimed to
be effective for helping policy makers identify measures that will broadly ad-
vance social welfare,2 and as a means of countering the efforts of special
interest groups, which often resist the implementation of such measures.3
Cost-benefit analysis plays a particularly important role in determining federal
environmental standards as well as in other federal administrative rulemaking.4
1. See generally CASS R. SuNsTIN, THE COsT-BFNEFrr STATE: THE FUruR OF REGULATORY PROTECTION
(Am. Bar Ass'n 2002) [hereinafter SUNsTE N 2002]. Some recent writers use the inverted phrase
"benefit-cost analysis" to describe this form of analysis, but in this Article I will consistently use the
traditional label.
2. "[Iln cost-benefit analysis we are concerned with the economy as a whole, with the welfare of a
defined society, and not any smaller part of it." E.J. MIsHAN, CosT-BENEFI ANALYsIS, at x (Praeger
Publishers 1976).
3. See SuNSTN 2002, supra note 1, at 26-28.
4. This method of policy evaluation was used to some extent in regulatory reviews under the Nixon,
Ford, and Carter Administrations. President Nixon first created a "Quality of Life Review" that gave the
Office of Management and Budget limited regulatory review authority. President Ford then required
several federal agencies to also provide inflation impact statements for review by the Council on Wage
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The prominent legal scholar Cass Sunstein, the current Director of the Office of
Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, has
gone so far as to claim that "[the] American government is becoming a cost-
benefit state,"5 and to endorse this development as helping to rationalize
government decision-making and insulate it from the pressure of special interest
groups, as well as increasing regulatory transparency and public accountability.
6
While .Sunstein's descriptive claim regarding the extensive use of the cost-
benefit methodology appears to be well founded, 7 his endorsement of this trend
is more problematic.8 In particular, there is considerable controversy regarding
whether cost-benefit analysis provides an adequately inclusive and unbiased
means of assessing policies and programs. 9 The literature on this topic is
and Price Stability. President Carter took another significant step towards institutionalizing cost-benefit
analysis as an aspect of federal rulemaking when he established the Regulatory Analysis Review Group
and issued Executive Order 12,044, which required economic impact statements for all proposed rules
having an overall impact of more than $100 million. See generally Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory
Process Reform from Ford to Clinton, 20 REG. (1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
regv20nl/reg20nla.htmI; THOMAS 0. McGARrrY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY,
ANALYsIS IN THE FEDERAL BuREAUcRAcY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
The significance of cost-benefit analysis for federal rulemaking was greatly enhanced by Executive
Order 12,291, issued in 1981 by President Reagan. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193
(Feb. 17, 1981). Executive Order 12,291 required many proposed executive branch regulatory initia-
tives to be accompanied by a Regulatory Impact Analysis containing an extensive cost-benefit analysis
of the proposal that had to be submitted to and approved by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, a new office created within the Office of Management and Budget, before the proposed
regulation could become effective. The Clinton Administration later replaced Executive Order 12,291
with a new Executive Order 12866 which made some minor changes in wording and procedures, but
which retained the substance of the cost-benefit analysis requirement for major rulemaking initiatives.
See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). The Bush Administration also
continued this policy.
Congress has also enacted numerous statutes in recent years requiring federal agencies to perform
cost-benefit analyses in connection with their rulemaking efforts. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A.
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 167 (1999) [hereinafter Adler & Posner
1999]. Prospective cost-benefit analyses of rulemaking initiatives and subsequent Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs review (and, upon occasion, also judicial review) therefore now appear to be
entrenched as a significant feature of the federal regulatory process. Similarly, cost-benefit analyses are
now also utilized to a lesser extent by many state governmental agencies for similar purposes. See
SuNsTEN 2002, supra note 1, at 26-28. See generally Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory
Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 873 (2000).
5. SuNSTEN 2002, supra note 1, at ix.
6. Id. at 26-28.
7. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences
Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1105 (2000); Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic
Analysis Improved Regulatory Decisions?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 68 (2008). But see Amy Sinden, Cass
Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004) (criticizing
Sunstein's claim as to the pervasiveness of cost-benefit analysis).
8. See Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs, 22 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2006) ("The basic superiority of CBA [cost-benefit analysis] as a policy
tool for risk regulation... is no longer seriously doubted ... [e]xcept, of course ... by serious, thought-
ful observers of the administrative state."). See generally Sinden, supra note 7.
9. See Sinden, supra note 7, at 201 (citing voluminous literature offering criticisms of cost-benefit
analysis); Adler & Posner 1999, supra note 4, at 167 ("The reputation of cost-benefit analysis...
among American academics has never been as poor as it is today."). See generally Frank Ackerman &
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extensive and includes a significant number of articles that sharply criticize this
approach."1
The essential feature of cost-benefit analysis is its embrace of the willingness
to pay valuation criterion. All impacts of the policies under consideration are
measured, to the extent feasible, by the affected persons' willingness to pay to
obtain the resulting benefits or to avoid the resulting burdens. Those benefit and
cost measures are then aggregated into bottom-line economic efficiency assess-
ments that do not address distributional considerations or rights-respecting
limitations.11 Such additional considerations and limitations are taken into ac-
count separately in the decision-making process, if at all.
The numerous criticisms of this methodology can be roughly, but usefully,
classified as either "external" or "internal." 1 2 The external critiques largely
reject the approach altogether, generally emphasizing the measurement problem
presented by what those critics regard as the fundamental incommensurability
of policy impacts of different character. The critics commonly conclude that
cost-benefit analysis is fatally flawed because of the impossibility of meaning-
fully measuring diverse impacts by a unitary monetary metric. These impacts
range from purely financial consequences to loss of life itself, and also include
difficult to quantify effects such as the empathetic sentiments aroused in support
of those persons more directly affected by a policy. 13 These external critiques
also commonly focus upon the well-known shortcomings of the use of eco-
nomic efficiency as a normative standard. 14
Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1553 (2002) (presenting a highly critical view of cost-benefit analysis); Kysar, supra note 8
(presenting a highly critical view of cost-benefit analysis).
10. See, e.g., Adler & Posner 1999, supra note 4; Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 9; Kysar,
supra note 8.
11. Stated in more theoretical terms, cost-benefit analysis is an attempt to determine the Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency consequences of a policy so that this information can guide the decision whether or not
to implement that policy. A policy will constitute a Kaldoi-Hicks improvement-a move towards
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-if the total benefits of the policy exceed its total costs, with both benefits and
costs measured by the willingness to pay of the affected persons to obtain those benefits or avoid those
costs. See Ricatw A. PosNER, EcONOMc ANALYsIs OF LAW 13 (6th ed. 2003). The Kaldor-Hicks cri-
terion is the usual measure of efficiency utilized by economists. Id. There are several seminal articles
and books that developed the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency concepts. See, e.g., John R. Hicks, The Founda-
tions of Welfare Economics, 49 EcON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of
Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 EcoN. J. 549 (1939); ANTroN E. BOARDMAN
Er AL., CosT-BENm'rr ANALYsis AND PRAcICE (Prentice Hall 2000) (1996); MisHAN, supra note 2.
12. Sinden, supra note 7, at 202.
13. Id. There is extensive literature advancing external critiques of the cost-benefit methodology
based on the incommensurability problem. See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 1553,
1563-64; Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971,
986-89 (2000); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981,
1984-85 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 IlcH. L. REy. 779,
784 (1994). See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 P1n. & PuB.
AFF. 66 (1972).
14. There is an extensive literature criticizing the use of economic efficiency as a normative
criterion. See, e.g., Adler & Posner 1999, supra note 4, at 191 ("[B]ecause Kaldor-Hicks [efficiency] is,
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The internal critiques, in contrast, sidestep these incommensurability and
normative criterion problems by accepting as a given premise the desirability of
assessing policies primarily, or even solely, through aggregating the affected
persons' willingness to pay to enjoy or to avoid their consequences. These critics
instead address the cost-benefit methodology on its own economic efficiency-
oriented terms. The critics point out a number of valuation problems which,
alone or in combination, may render, futile attempts to quantify costs and
benefits in an objective manner because they simply do not reflect the analyst's
personal ethical and political preferences.1 5 The valuation problems noted by
these critiques include the difficulty in determining appropriate discount rates
for use in evaluating future consequences, 16 the problem of determining whether
offer prices or asking prices are the appropriate measure of willingness to pay in
instances where they diverge in magnitude, 17 and the dependence of the magni-
tude of both offer and asking prices on the existing distribution of wealth.18
Those internal critiques commonly emphasize the severe data availability limita-
tions facing cost-benefit analysts, including the difficulty of often having inad-
equate data to confidently establish affected persons' willingness to pay for even
the known impacts of a policy,19 as well as the common problem of scientific
uncertainty as to both the scope and magnitude of the likely consequences of
many policies or programs.2 °
I have previously attempted to contribute to both branches of this critical
literature.21 In this Article, however, I will not address any of these external or
internal critiques that I have noted. I will instead elaborate upon a different
internal critique of the cost-benefit methodology, one which has been underappre-
taken as a moral principle, unsound, [cost-benefit analysis] cannot be justified by reference to
Kaldor-Hicks."); Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 1567-68; Gregory Scott Crespi, The
Mid-Life Crisis of'the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability
and Normative Bias, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 231, 234-37 (1991) [hereinafter Crespi 1991]; MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRrncAL LEGAL STuDIES 114-50 (Harvard Univ. Press 1987). See generally
Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HoF TRA L. REv. 485 (1980) (collecting several articles
on economic efficiency).
15. See Adler & Posner 1999, supra note 4, at 202-03. There is an extensive literature advancing
such internal critiques of the cost-benefit methodology. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 7, at 205-10
(citing many articles presenting such critiques). See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regu-
lation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLJM. L. REv. 941 (1999)
(criticizing commonly used approaches to discounting future loss of life consequences).
16. There is extensive literature relating to the question of the choice of discount rates by which to
discount future impacts in cost-benefit analysis. See generally Revesz, supra note 15.
17. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Choosing Between Offer and
Asking Prices as the Appropriate Measure of Willingness to Pay, 39 J. MARsHALL. L. REv. 429' 432
(2006) [hereinafter Crespi 20061. See generally Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer!
Asking Problem Price Gap: Towards a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REv. 663
(1994).
18. Sinden, supra note 7, at 206-07.
19. Sinden, supra note 7, at 208-10 (discussing several problems which call into question the
validity and reliability of various methods of measuring willingness to pay).
20. See id. at 205-12.
21. See, e.g., Crespi 2006, supra note 17; Crespi 1991, supra note 14.
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ciated and which has significant adverse implications for the validity of assess-
ing of policy consequences by the willingness to pay yardstick used in cost-.
benefit analysis. My criticism is that conventional cost-benefit analyses do not
address what I will refer to as the "endogeneity problem." That is to say, they do
not confront the difficulties involved in valuing policies under those circum-
stances when one of their consequences is a significant alteration of the prefer-
ences of a substantial number of people, or even an alteration of the fundamental
genetic identities of the members of distant future generations.
The conventional simplifying analytical assumptions made by virtually all
cost-benefit analysts is that while the policy under consideration may well affect
the circumstances facing persons in numerous ways, it will not affect those
persons' underlying preference structures,22 nor affect the fundamental genetic
identities of the members of future generations.23 In other words, personal
identities and preferences are assumed to be established exogenously and not
endogenously determined by the policy under consideration. This assumption
provides a stable reference point for use in valuing the consequences of the
policy.
Such an assumption greatly facilitates policy analysis, but what if this is not
the case? What if a particular policy significantly alters preference structures of
a substantial proportion of the affected population, or fundamentally alters the
genetic identity of the members of future generations, or both? The errors
introduced by basing an analysis on such simplifying assumptions when they
are not satisfied may well be too high a price to pay for such analytical
tractability.24 I will in this Article explore this possibility.
22. See Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and other
Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. Lir. 75, 75 (1998) ("Markets and other economic institutions...
influence the evolution of values, tastes and personalities. Economists have long assumed otherwise;
the axiom of exogenous preferences is as old as liberal political philosophy itself."); Albert 0.
Hirschman, Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic
Discourse, 1 EcoN. & PHiL. 7, 10 (1985) ("Economists often... think of citizens as consumers with
unchanging or arbitrarily changing tastes in matters of civics as well as commodity-oriented behavior.
This view tends to neglect the possibility that people are capable of changing their values."); George J.
Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. EON. REv. 76, 76-77 (1977)
("[O]ne may usefully treat tastes as stable over time .... [N]o other approach of remotely comparable
generality and power is available."); Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions as More Than Prices:
The Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW AND ECONOMIcS: NEW AND
CRIcAL PERsPEcnvEs 153 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher Braun eds., Peter Lang Publ'g 1995)
[hereinafter Dau-Schmidt 1995] ("The traditional economic analysis of law .... assumes that people's
preferences are exogenous.").
23. I am not aware of any cost-benefit analyses that have even attempted to address this problem.
24. See Bowles, supra note 22, at 75 ("[By making the assumption of exogenous preferences] the
scope of economic inquiry is thereby truncated in ways which restrict its explanatory power, policy
relevance, and ethical coherence. If preferences are affected by the policies or institutional arrange-
ments we study, we can neither accurately predict nor coherently evaluate the likely consequences of
new policies or institutions without taking account of preference endogeneity."); Kenneth Dat-Schmidt,
An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1, 17
(1990) ("It is becoming increasingly apparent that the failure to address the malleability of preferences
seriously limits the explanatory power of economic analysis.") [hereinafter Dau-Schmidt 1990].
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The endogeneity of preferences and the endogeneity of identity problems are
closely related, but there are nevertheless enough differences between their
impacts on cost-benefit analysis that they merit separate treatment. Therefore, I
will first address in some detail in Part II of this Article the substantial problems
posed for cost-benefit analysis by the possible endogeneity of preferences, and I
will then offer my suggestions as to how those problems might be better
addressed. My overall conclusion here is that while these problems are indeed
difficult, they appear to be surmountable through making appropriate adjust-
ments in the cost-benefit valuation methodology. I will then turn in Part III to
the more dramatic and far more imposing analytical problem posed for cost-
benefit analysis by not merely the possibility but the virtual certainty that any
social policy whatsoever will alter the fundamental genetic identity of many,
and eventually all, members of future generations. The genetic identities of
those future persons are in general not exogenous but are endogenously deter-
mined by the policies that we pursue, and this fact has momentous and perhaps
even fatal consequences for the conduct of cost-benefit analyses. In Part IV I
will present a brief overall conclusion.25
I. THE ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES PROBLEM
A. A General Introduction
The questions presented for policy valuation when preferences are endoge-
nous with regard to the policy at issue have significant practical consequences,
since it is clear that some policies will have as one of their impacts the
substantial alteration of many of the affected persons' preferences. 26 Environmen-
tal policies are one area where this is particularly likely to be the case. Many
persons may never have experienced certain environmental amenities, and
because of their lack of familiarity with the character of those amenities, they
may value them very modestly relative to their costs and therefore oppose
policies designed to bring them into existence.27 Once such environmental
25. 1 have separately addressed certain aspects each of these problems in some of my recent work.
See Gregory Scott Crespi, Incorporating Endogenous Preferences in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 17 PENN.
ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 157 (2009) (addressing the endogenous preferences problem in the environmental
law context); Gregory Scott Crespi, The Fatal Flaw of Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Problem of
Person-Altering Consequences, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. News & ANALtsis 10703 (2008) [hereinafter Crespi
2008] (addressing the problem of endogeneity of identity in the environmental law context); Gregory
Scott Crespi, What's Wrong with Dumping Radioactive Wastes in the Ocean? The Surprising Ethical
and Policy Analysis Implications of the Problem of Person-Altering Consequences, 37 ENVTL. L. REP.
News & ANALYsIs 10873 (2007) [hereinafter Crespi 2007] (addressing the ethical issues raised in the
environmental law context by the problem of endogeneity of identity). I hope in this Article to extend
that prior work and to demonstrate that these problems are closely related to one another as separate
aspects of the more general endogeneity problem.
26. See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LAL STw. 217, 220 (1993)
("There is sometimes no such thing as a fully acontextual preference, and that preferences are endogenous to
existing legal policy, including the setting of the legal entitlement.") [hereinafter Sunstein 1993].
27. See id. at 236-37 (giving an example of what Sunstein refers to as "adaptive preferences").
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policies have been implemented, however, and people begin to experience those
amenities, some of those people may well reassess their preferences in light of
their greater awareness and understanding of the benefits provided by those
amenities and may now accord them a higher value that exceeds their cost. A
willingness to pay-based cost-benefit analysis valuation of such a policy might
turn out very differently if the policy is valued by the yardstick of the post-
policy implementation preference structures than if it is valued by the pre-policy
implementation preference structures.
More generally, many policies have educational and character-shaping objec-
tives,28 which may sometimes even be the primary goal of the policy at issue.29
If those policies are successful in achieving this objective, some persons who
originally opposed those policies may, on the basis of their new attitudes and
preferences, now regard them as being cost-justified. In these instances, the
choice between using pre-policy implementation or instead post-policy implemen-
tation preference structures for valuations may prove outcome-determinative.
If a policy significantly alters the preference structures of a substantial
number of persons, and if one wishes to incorporate this preference structure
endogeneity into the valuation calculations, some difficult analytical questions
are presented. Should the pre-policy implementation preference structures be
used to value the policy's consequences, or should instead the different post-
policy implementation preference structures be- used to make those valuations?
If the latter, what role, if any, should be played by any transitional post-policy
implementation preference structures that may exist for a period of time before
the final stable post-policy implementation preference structures come into being? 
30
Under the simplifying exogenous preferences assumption, the same prefer-
ence structures are assumed to exist both before and after the implementation of
28. See Dau-Schmidt 1995, supra note 22, at 153 ("[There are] various areas in the law.., in which
legal prohibitions are not merely intended to act as a price on the proscribed behavior, but are also
intended to influence the underlying preferences of the sanctioned parties and other members of
society.").
29. See Dau-Schmidt 1990, supra note 24, at 17 ("Preference shaping... is an important human
endeavor. It has been identified as a primary or secondary goal of childrearing, education, religion,
advertising, public service announcements, legislation, and ... criminal punishment. Although econo-
mists might find it useful to assume that preference-shaping processes are exogenous to their analysis of
traditional markets, when economists expand their analysis to social institutions that are more inti-
mately related to the preference-shaping processes, either affecting or being affected by them, this
assumption should be relaxed .... Although it complicates empirical tests and introduces greater
subjectivity via the social welfare analysis, relaxing the assumption that preferences are exogenous
promises greater understanding of many social phenomena."); Hirschman, supra note 22, at 10 ("A
principle purpose of publicly proclaimed laws and regulations is to stigmatize antisocial behavior and
thereby influence citizens' values and behavior codes. This educational, value-molding function of the
law is as important as its deterrent and repressive functions.").
30. In some cases temporary, transitional preference structures may be created for some persons by
the policy's implementation, and these transitional preference structures may persist for some time
before the final, stable, post-policy implementation preference structures come into being. If so, these
transitional preference structures would be additional candidates for inclusion in a valuation frame-
work. See, e.g., GARY S. BEcKR, AccoUrTiNo FOR TAsTES 20 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
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the policy. Analysts making this assumption for valuation purposes generally
fail to make clear in their analyses whether those preference structures are being
utilized for valuation purposes because they are the pre-policy implementation
preference structures, with the fact that they are also the post-policy implementa-
tion preference structures not being germane, or whether they are being utilized
because they are the post-policy implementation preference structures, with the
fact that they are also the pre-policy implementation preference structures not
being germane. There is no real need for them to address this question as to the
underlying rationale of their valuation approach if the preference structures are
assumed to be invariant.
Under endogenous preferences circumstances, however, a rationale must be
advanced that would justify the choices made among these differing preference
structures for valuation purposes. A modest body of literature exists that notes
the significance of the endogenous preferences problem for policy valuation
efforts3 1 and to a limited extent attempts to address the problem.32 However,
that scholarship is incomplete and has not definitively resolved the conundrum,
and as noted above, most cost-benefit analysts simply ignore the implications of
the possibility of endogenous preferences in their work.33
In this Part H of this Article, I will discuss how policy impacts should be
valued in those instances when there are significantly differing pre-policy
implementation and post-policy implementation preference structures, and possi-
bly also distinct transitional preference structures, for a substantial number of
affected persons. In order to more clearly focus my analysis on these specific
questions, I will limit its scope in certain regards. First, I will take as a given the
premise that people have at any point in time coherent preferences, and that
their preference structures can be accurately ascertained and then used for
determining those persons' willingness to pay for policy benefits or to avoid
policy costs. 3 4 Given these assumptions, the main question at issue is how best
31. See, e.g., id. ("The endogeneity of preferences would appear to play havoc with traditional
approaches to welfare evaluations of economic outcomes.").
32. See generally id.; Bowles, supra note 22; Dau-Schmidt 1995, supra note 22; Sunstein 1993,
supra note 26.
33. See, e.g., a recent and otherwise rather comprehensive discussion of cost-benefit analysis written
by John Graham, who served as the Director of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within
the Office of Management and Budget from 2001-2006, in which he does not even mention the
problems posed for the validity of cost-benefit analysis by the possibility of endogenous preferences.
John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395
(2008).
34. Not every commentator agrees with this assumption. In particular, Cass Sunstein has argued
extensively that people's preferences often "do not, in any simple way, antedate the process that is used
to elicit them.., preferences and values can be a function of methods of elicitation, or construction."
Cass R. Sunstein, How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637, 2652 (1998) [hereinafter
Sunstein 1998]. Under those circumstances, valuations achieved through use of those preferences
would inevitably be suspect as being biased by the manner of elicitation. Sunstein has also argued that
even apart from those biases introduced by measurement efforts, "sometimes there are no acontextual
preferences with which to do normative or descriptive work," and under those circumstances "policy-
makers cannot simply identify preferences and try to satisfy them since the preferences are influenced
2010]
100 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
to choose among these preference structures to obtain a policy valuation that
most meaningfully reflects the preferences of the affected persons.
Second, I will consider only non-paternalistic approaches to resolving the
endogenous preferences valuation problem. I will not explore the possibility of
taking a paternalistic approach that might utilize for valuation purposes which-
ever of those two or more actual preference structures are regarded by the
analyst as best reflecting the "true" interests of the affected persons, those
interests being somehow defined apart from their actual preference structures.
Nor will I consider the even more paternalistic tact of utilizing for valuations
some other hypothetical "ideal" preference structure that the analyst believes
that the affected persons "should have" to further their "true" interests, and that
differs from all of the actually observed preference structures.35
I will also not address in this Article the important but conceptually distinct
question of whether offer prices or instead asking prices should be utilized to
establish the magnitude of willingness to pay once the appropriate preference
structures for valuation purposes have been chosen. 36 1 will, however, address in
this Article to a limited extent the nature and severity of the measurement
difficulties involved in ascertaining these different preference structures, and
how these difficulties may as a practical matter call for some departure from
theoretically ideal valuation procedures. I will focus this particular discussion
upon how those measurement difficulties may vary with regard to whether
pre-policy implementation or instead post-policy implementation preference
structures are being ascertained, and with regard to whether the cost-benefit
analysis is being conducted on a prospective or instead a retrospective basis.
Let me here briefly summarize my overall conclusions with regard to the
endogenous preferences problem. In my opinion, under those circumstances
where preference structures are to a significant extent endogenous with regard
to the policy at issue, that policy should as a general matter be evaluated solely
with regard to the post-policy implementation preference structures, rather than
by the yardstick of the pre-policy implementation preference structures. If there
are any transitional preference structures they should be used for valuing those
particular policy consequences that occur while those transitional preference struc-
tures are in existence. The use of an endogenous preference valuation framework in
by law, and since there is no way to identify the preferences that would exist in the absence of law."
Sunstein 1993, supra note 26, at 221.
35. I will instead accept as a premise the desirability of utilizing persons' actual preference
structures for valuation purposes in a non-paternalistic fashion, and will consider only the questions that
arise under endogenous preference circumstances where there is more than one plausible candidate for
this role. I recognize that this is a contestable approach. Some commentators have argued that there
may often not be any such "actual" preference structures that are not biased by the method of elicitation
that can be applied for making valuations without the need for prior and inevitably paternalistic
corrections of those biases, that all revealed preference structures are contextual and influenced by law
and thus any attempt to ascertain peoples' preference structures for valuation purposes is also an
inherently paternalistic enterprise. See, e.g.., Sunstein 1998, supra note 34, at 2652.
36. See, e.g., Crespi 2006, supra note 17; see also Korobkin, supra note 17.
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this manner when conducting cost-benefit analyses of policies that may alter
preferences may upon occasion have significant consequences for the results of
those analyses. This recommended endogenous preferences valuation frame-
work may, however, need to be modified upon occasion to reflect preference
structure estimation difficulties and to counter potential analyst bias, particu-
larly when conducting prospective rather than retrospective cost-benefit analy-
ses.
I will proceed as follows in the remainder of Part II of this Article. In
Part Il.B, I will briefly discuss the efforts of several other scholars to address the
problem of incorporating endogenous preference into cost-benefit analysis valu-
ation efforts. I will then, in Part II.C, offer my own thoughts regarding how this
problem can be best addressed as a theoretical matter and what adjustments in
that theoretical approach are likely to be necessary to accommodate practical
measurement limitations. In Part II.D of the Article, I will then present a brief
summary of my conclusionswith regard to the endogenous preferences problem.
B. Prior Efforts to Address the Problem of Endogenous Preferences in
Cost-Benefit Analysis
The most substantial contributions in this area have been provided by Gary
Becker, Cass Sunstein, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, and Samuel Bowles. Let me
briefly discuss in turn the contributions of each of these scholars.
1. The Becker "Extended Utility Function" Approach
The problem of valuing policy consequences under circumstances of endoge-
nous preferences can be analytically dealt with in a number of facially different
but conceptually equivalent ways. For example, one could redefine any situation
where a policy would alter preference structures as instead being a situation
where the affected persons' preference structures were exogenously determined
and not altered by that policy, but where there were now some additional policy
impacts specified that were just significant enough in magnitude to generate the
same overall policy valuation that would result under an endogenous preference
assumption if the post-policy implementation preference structures were uti-
lized there for making the valuations, but without those newly specified policy
impacts being included in the valuation calculations. In other words, one could
redefine the preference changes caused by a policy under an endogenous
preferences assumption as instead being newly specified policy impacts of an
appropriate magnitude under an exogenous preferences assumption, and still
reach the same policy valuation results. This type of alternative conceptual
framework for dealing with endogenous preferences has been suggested by the
Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker in his well-known book AccoUNT-
ING FOR TASTES.3 7
37. See BECKER, supra note 30, at 3-23.
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Becker there defines the concept of an exogenously determined "extended
utility function" 38 that would also include two additional factors affecting a
person's utility that are qualitatively different from the availability of ordinary
goods and services. He labels these new factors "personal capital" and "social
capital," respectively.39 The amount of each of these capital stocks held by an
individual at any point in time would then affect the total utility that the person
would obtain from the availability of ordinary goods and services, and from the
other circumstances facing that individual, at that point in time.40 The conse-
quences of a policy for each affected individual at any point in time would then
be partly a function of the changes the policy has made in the amount of these
personal and social capital stocks. Those individual valuations of the policy's
consequences at each point in time would then each be time-discounted to a
present value as of the time of the implementation of the policy, and then these
time-specific valuations would be aggregated into an overall assessment of the
policy's consequences for that individual. Those individual policy valuations
would then be aggregated across the population to obtain an overall global
policy assessment.4 Becker argues that the conventional exogenous preference
assumption can be usefully and credibly retained in this manner for cost-benefit
analytical work, despite his recognition that preferences are in fact often
endogenous, if the valuations of policy impacts are based upon such extended
utility functions that still posit exogenous preferences but which now also take
into account the policy impacts upon these two appropriately defined capital
stock factors over time in a suitable manner.4 2
I am reluctant to criticize in any way an economist of Becker's stature, but I
do not believe that his suggested approach solves the endogenous preferences
valuation problem. His attempt to retain the exogenous preference assumption
while mitigating its shortcomings through the inclusion of two additional
factors in the utility function specification that together substitute for recogniz-
ing preference endogeneity is indeed creative and interesting. But this approach
ultimately only reframes the valuation problem rather than resolving it, and
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id. at 4 ("Personal Capital, P, includes the relevant past consumption and other personal
experiences that affect current and future utilities. Social Capital, S, incorporates the influence of past
actions of peers and others in an individual's social network and control system.").
40. Id. at 5.
41. See id. at 20 ("A welfare analysis should consider not only the initial effects on utility when...
[the affected persons may intensely dislike the policy], nor only the ultimate effects when ... [the
affected persons may like the policy], but the discounted value of both the initial and later changes in
utilities that incorporates the transition between the initial and later attitudes toward [the policy] .... In
other words, initial preferences should have no priority over final preferences in welfare analysis when
policies change preferences.").
42. See id. ("These difficulties [of conducting valuations where preferences are endogenous to the
policy in question], however, are intrinsic not to the endogeneity of preferences but to inadequate
incorporation of this endogeneity into welfare criteria. If the relevant utility function for welfare
analysis includes personal and social capital, the effect on utility of... public policies can be evaluated
without any ambiguity.").
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moreover does so in a manner that tends to obscure rather than illuminate the
nature of the choices that must be made.
Let me explain this point more fully. In the endogenous preferences frame-
work, the central question presented is whether the pre-policy implementation
preference structures should be used to value a policy's consequences, or
whether instead the post-policy implementation preference structures, perhaps
including any transitional preference structures, should be used for making
those valuations. Under Becker's proposed extended utility function approach,
the analogous question posed would be whether the utility functions with the
pre-policy implementation stocks of personal and social capital, as he has
defined them, should be used to make the policy valuations, or instead whether
the utility functions with the post-policy implementation levels of these capital
stocks, and perhaps also utility functions with transitional levels of these capital
stocks, should be used for making the valuations.
The close parallels between an endogenous preference approach and Becker's
extended utility function approach are fairly obvious. His method simply trans-
forms the need to ascertain the contours of the different preference structures
that are in existence at each point in time, a requirement for conducting
valuations under the endogenous preferences framework to the extent that each
of these preference. structures will play a part in deriving the final policy
valuations, into the need to measure the size of the different stocks of personal
and social "capital," as idiosyncratically defined by Becker, at each point in
time under an exogenous preferences assumption, to the extent that these
different capital stocks at different points in time will play a part in deriving the
final policy valuation.
There is nothing that would prohibit one from making this transformation of
analytical categories, but it is not clear what the pay-off is for doing so. One
could certainly incorporate those post-policy implementation stocks of Beck-
erian personal and social capital that exist at any point in time into the
willingness to pay-based valuation calculations in the same manner that one
would incorporate the post-policy implementation quantities of goods and
services that normally affect utility. If the parameters of the extended utility
function and the magnitude of the changes made in the personal and social
capital stocks of various individuals at each point in time were each appropri-
ately specified so as to yield the same valuations of policy impacts as would the
endogenous preference framework were one to use post-policy implementation
.preference structures, then Becker's approach would lead to exactly the same
policy valuation results as one would obtain under the endogenous preferences
framework.
However, as noted above, this analytical tact only reframes rather than
resolves the central valuation questions posed by the existence of endogenous
preferences. The main unanswered question under the endogenous preferences
formulation of the valuation problem is whether the post-policy implementation
preference structures, permanent or transitional, should be privileged over the
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pre-policy implementation preference structures in deriving the policy valua-
tion, and if so to what extent. Becker's approach specifies an alternative
conceptual framework of exogenous preferences combined with newly defined
personal and social capital stocks that change in response to policy impacts,
rather than endogenous preference changes, as establishing the parameters
that need to be established to calculate the willingness to pay-based policy
valuations for each relevant period of time. But his method simply transforms
the central and difficult question presented by the endogenous preferences
framework into the equally difficult question of whether the pre-policy implemen-
tation or instead post-policy implementation personal and capital stocks are to
be privileged in conducting a policy valuation, and if so, then what weight, if
any, will be given to transitional amounts of these stocks as compared to their
final, stable amounts? This new question is unfortunately left unaddressed by
Becker.
2. Other Commentary Regarding Incorporating Endogenous Preferences in
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Let me now turn to consider the efforts of some other scholars to address the
endogenous preferences valuation problem. None of the few commentators other than
Gary Becker who have considered this question in any depth, specifically Cass
Sunstein,43 Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, 44 and Samuel Bowles, 45 offer a framework
for choosing the appropriate preference structures to use to conduct a cost-
benefit valuation of the impacts of a particular policy that does not require a
paternalistic assessment on the part of the analyst as to which of these prefer-
ence structures best reflect the affected persons' "true" preference structure, or
otherwise is more deserving of respect. Let me briefly discuss each of their
contributions below, and I will then draw upon their insights and the work of
Becker in Part Ill of this Article where I will offer my own contributions.
(i) Cass Sunstein's Views. As I have noted, this Article proceeds upon the
premise that, under endogenous preference circumstances, one can accurately
measure the pre-policy implementation preference structures, post-policy imple-
mentation preference structures, and any transitional preference structures. Given
this premise, I address the question of how to appropriately choose among the
different policy valuations that can be derived from each of these preference
structures in a non-paternalistic fashion. Cass Sunstein in his seminal 1993 article on
endogenous preferences, however, calls into question this entire enterprise. 46
There, Sunstein argues that there often are no objectively existing preference
structures that can be ascertained that merit such deference, and that an analyst
43. See generally Sunstein 1993, supra note 26.
44. See generally Dau-Schmidt 1995, supra note 22.
45. See generally Bowles, supra note 22.
46. See generally Sunstein 1993, supra note 26.
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therefore often has no choice but to paternalistically impose what she regards as
the most appropriate preference structures to use for valuation purposes. These
selected preference structures may not closely resemble any of the different
pre-policy implementation or post-policy implementation preference structures
noted above, which he argues may not even exist in any meaningful sense.
Sunstein's core argument is that legal rules or other social policies inevitably
have effects on preferences, and consequently no preference structures can
be properly regarded as pristine pre-legal and pre-political expressions of
people's "true" preferences. 47 In his view, pre-policy implementation prefer-
ence structures often do not merit deference for use in valuing the policy's
consequences because they are "adaptive preferences, 48 that is, artifacts of and
psychological accommodations to the limitations imposed by existing law and
social institutions."9 Even though these pre-policy implementation preference
structures have been shaped by previously adopted laws and policies, rather
than by the policy at issue that is being evaluated in cost-benefit terms in
advance of its possible implementation in Sunstein's opinion, those pre-policy
implementation preference structures are often so tainted as purported measures
of "true" individual preferences because of the adaptive preferences effects of
existing laws and other social institutions that they do not merit deference for
policy valuation purposes.5° Sunstein gives particular emphasis to arguments
that debates regarding many environmental policy questions are rendered less
meaningful because they take place against the background of pre-policy imple-
mentation preference structures that are distorted by this adaptive preference
effect.5
1
Sunstein .also in his 1993 article briefly calls into question the use of
post-policy implementation preference structures as a basis for policy valuation,
on the general grounds that "when preferences are a function of legal rules, the
rules cannot be justified by reference to the preferences. 52 There is, in his
opinion, a bootstrapping problem presented by the use of post-policy implemen-
tation preference structures; policies cannot be meaningfully evaluated or justi-
fied by those very preference structures that they have helped create.53
Sunstein buttresses these arguments for not utilizing either the pre-policy
implementation or the post-policy implementation preference structures for
47. Id. at 221-35.
48. Id. at 236-37.
49. Id. at 234-35 ("The most general point is that the preference-shaping effects of legal rules cast
doubt on the idea that environmental regulations should attempt to satisfy or follow some aggregation
of private preferences.... Sometimes there is no such thing as a prelegal or prepolitical 'preference'
that can be used as the basis for decision. If this is so, government is not quite faced with a choice
between respecting and rejecting private preferences. This is a misdescription of the real options.").
50. Id. at 254 ("Private preferences are an inadequate basis for environmental policy insofar as these
are adaptive to an environmentally inadequate status quo.").
51. Id. at 230-42.
52. Sunstein 1993, supra note 26, at 235.
53. See id. at 221, 234-35, 237.
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policy valuation purposes with the related but conceptually distinct argument
that any measured preference structures, even apart from their being distorted
from "true" preferences by psychological adaptations to the limitations im-
posed by pre-policy implementation legal and political circumstances or by the
effects of the policy in question, simply do not have an objective existence
independent of their means of elicitation.54 There is something analogous to the
"Heisenberg uncertainty principle" at work here; any method by which an
analyst attempts to measure preference structures will strongly influence the
results obtained, rendering those results suspect as indicia of "true" preferences
even apart from the adaptative preferences and bootstrapping effects. 55 Sun-
stein's more recent Work shows that he is still firmly of this opinion as to the
sensitivity of measures of preference structures to the context of and methods of
their elicitation.56
Sunstein recognizes that preferences are often endogenous to a significant
extent. However, as I have noted above, he implicitly rejects the core premise of
this Article that it may be possible to establish an appropriate framework for
selecting among the different pre-policy implementation and post-policy imple-
mentation preference structures for use in valuing a policy in a non-paternalistic
fashion, because he rejects all of these preference structures as potentially being
too biased and/or unreliably ascertained to use for policy valuation purposes. He
therefore does not offer a proposed resolution of the endogenous preferences
valuation problem in the terms that I have framed it in this Article. Some of his
insights, however, are nevertheless germane to the enterprise of attempting to
resolve the valuation problem viewed in these terms, and I will draw upon those
insights in Part III of this Article.
Sunstein continues in his more recent work to flatly reject the idea that policy
valuations can or should be carried out in a non-paternalistic manner that is
grounded in expressed or otherwise revealed preferences.57 He instead endorses
the more paternalistic approach of disregarding these preferences, both pre-
policy implementation preferences and post-policy implementation preferences,
choosing instead to value policies with regard to their efficacy "to move people
in welfare-promoting directions" 58 that are determined to be so desirable by
some external criteria other than those persons' preferences. His attempt to jus-
tify this approach in the face of the usual strong criticisms made of governmen-
tal policymakers who choose to disregard expressed or otherwise revealed
54. See Sunstein 1998, supra note 34, at 2652.
55. See id.
56. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
Cut. L. REv. 1159, 1161 (2003) ("[I]n many domains, people lack clear, stable or well-ordered
preferences. What they choose is strongly influenced by details of the context in which they make their
choice, for example default rules, framing effects ... and starting points. These contextual influences
render the meaning of the term 'preferences' unclear.").
57. See id. at 1164 ("The first misconception is that there are viable alternatives to paternalism.").
58. Id. at 1162.
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preferences to purportedly achieve greater social welfare59 is to me rather
unconvincing, but that is the subject of another article.
(ii) Kenneth Dau-Schmidt's Views. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt has written two im-
portant pieces relating to endogenous preferences, each of which focuses primar-
ily, although not exclusively, on issues raised by the criminal law. 60 His primary
emphasis in these two articles is making clear the importance and pervasiveness
of the preference-shaping effects of many laws and social policies,6  and
determining when preference-shaping policies are to be preferred over policies
that only shape opportunities.62 He was not focusing upon my inquiry regarding
how to properly conduct a cost-benefit assessment of a policy that has both
opportunity-altering and preference-shaping consequences, a topic that he ad-
dresses only tangentially. He does, however, offer some insights that are useful
for one making this effort.
Dau-Schmidt recognizes that the existence of endogenous preferences with
regards to a policy undermines the application of conventional social welfare
criteria to evaluate that policy, 63 including the willingness to pay criterion that is
generally utilized in cost-benefit analysis under the exogenous preference assump-
tion. The closest that he comes to taking an explicit position as to which of the
various pre-policy implementation and post-policy implementation preference
structures should be utilized for valuation purposes in cost-benefit analysis is
the following, somewhat cryptic statement that he offers in his 1990 article
59. See id. at 1166 ("Once it is understood that... a form of paternalism cannot be avoided, and that
the alternatives to paternalism (such as choosing options to make people worse off) are unattractive, we
can abandon the less interesting question of whether to be paternalistic or not, and turn to the more
constructive question of how to choose among the possible choice-influencing options. To this end we
make two general suggestions. First, programs should be designed using a type of welfare analysis, one
in which a serious attempt is made to measure the costs and benefits of outcomes (rather than relying on
estimates of willingness to pay). Choosers should be given more choices if the welfare benefits exceed
the welfare costs. Second, some results from the psychology of decisionmaking should be used to
provide ex ante guidelines to support reasonable judgments about when consumers and workers will
gain most by increasing options."). This quote clearly articulates the controversial paternalistic premise
-that governmental officials, supported by "reasonable guidelines" that are grounded in modem theories
of psychology, can be trusted to accurately assess the "true" social costs and benefits of policies without
having to rely upon the expressed willingness to pay for or to avoid policy consequences of the affected
persons to make those assessments.
60. See generally Dau-Schmidt 1995, supra note 22; Dau-Schmidt 1990, supra note 24.
61. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt 1995, supra note 22, at 158-68; Dau-Schmidt 1990, supra note 24, at 16.
62. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt 1995, supra note 22, at 168-70; Dau-Schmidt 1990, supra note 24, at
14-24.
63. There are a variety of possible social welfare criteria that can be derived from individual utility
functions that could be used for policy assessment. The approach utilized by cost-benefit analysis in
aggregating willingness to pay across all affected persons is only one of the many possible options.
Many of the proposed social welfare criteria, however, are grounded in some fashion upon individual
preferences as to possible states of society. All social welfare functions of this type are faced with the
need to deal somehow with the endogenous preferences problem in making their assessments of
policies that alter preferences. See Dau-Schmidt 1990, supra note 24, at 6-8.
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regarding what he views as the minimally acceptable properties of an adequate
social welfare function:
To ensure a rational social preference ordering [in light of the 'impossibility
theorem' results demonstrated by Kenneth Arrow), economists usually assume
that interpersonal comparisons of the intensity of individuals' preferences are
possible, and that the intensity of individuals' preferences is reflected in the
social preference ordering. If one allows preferences to vary, then it is also
necessary to assume that intertaste comparisons of the intensity of an individu-
al's preferences are possible, and that intertaste intensity is also reflected in
the social preference function. To account for these interpersonal and inter-
taste comparisons, the social welfare function has been modeled as a summa-
tion of individual utility functions which reflect the intensity of preference in
their measure of utility.64
I have assumed for the purposes of this article that the pre-policy implementa-
tion preference structures, the post-policy implementation preference structures,
and any transitional preferences structures can each be accurately ascertained,
and the primary question here considered is how to combine the policy valua-
tions derived from each of these different preference structures for overall
policy valuation purposes. Under this assumption, the willingness of any indi-
vidual to pay for a given policy can be precisely determined under each of these
preference structures, thus satisfying Dau-Schmidt's suggested minimal require-
ments for a valuation methodology that it be able to make interpersonal and
intertaste comparisons.
These minimal requirements, however, do not mandate. that any particular
choices be made among the different policy valuations derived from each of
these different preference structures in making the overall policy valuation.
However, the major thrust of Dau-Schmidt's work is to emphasize the impor-
tance of recognizing the endogeneity of preferences in areas such as the
criminal law where preference-shaping is often one of the primary goals of the
policies undertaken, and to offer suggestions regarding how to assess when such
preference-shaping measures are appropriate to undertake. It is consequently
most unlikely that he would embrace a valuation methodology that totally
ignored the post-policy implementation preference structures and any transi-
tional preference structures, as this approach would be tantamount to making
the exogenous preference assumption that he rejects as particularly inadequate
in those contexts.
(iii) Samuel Bowles' Views. Samuel Bowles is a prominent economist who
has emphasized the importance of taking into account preference endogeneity
64. Id. at 7-8.
[Vol. 8:91
THE ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
for both descriptive and normative purposes.65 While recognizing the advan-
tages of the conventional exogenous preferences assumption for analytical
tractability and for placing limits upon excessive paternalism,66 Bowles also
recognizes that under many circumstances the lack of realism of this assumption
undercuts its usefulness.6 7
Bowles' work parallels that of Dau-Schmidt in that he attempts to emphasize
the importance of recognizing preference endogeneity in many important policy-
making contexts. He also suggests the general contours of the comprehensive
research program that he believes is called for to increase our currently inad-
equate understanding of the processes of preference formation and alteration,68
and describes the practical significance that such greater understanding of those
processes would have for economic and social policy.6 9 But while Bowles
generally notes that preference endogeneity has implications for policy evalua-
tion,70 he does not offer any specific suggestions germane to this Article's
inquiry as to how the different pre-policy implementation and post-policy
implementation preference structures, once determined, should be utilized for
cost-benefit analysis valuation purposes. His comments do, however, suggest
caution in giving substantial weight to post-policy implementation preference
structures in making policy valuations under circumstances where the uncertain-
ties regarding the accuracy of the forecasting of those future preference struc-
tures are sufficiently great to raise concerns of covert paternalistic biases being
imposed by analysts.7 1
C. My Approach to Making. Valuations in Cost-Benefit Analysis Under
Endogenous Preferences Circumstances
Before I offer my own thoughts for the reader's consideration as to the most
appropriate theoretical framework for the incorporation of endogenous prefer-
65. See Bowles, supra note 22, at 75 ("If preferences are affected by the policies or institutional
arrangements we study, we can neither accurately predict nor coherently evaluate the likely conse-
quences of new policies or institutions without taking account of preference endogeneity.").
66. See id. at 102 ("The implicit premise that policies.., do not affect preferences has much to
recommend it: the premise provides a common if minimal analytical framework applicable to a wide
range of issues of public concern, it expresses a prudent antipathy toward paternalistic attempts at
social engineering of the psyche. It modestly acknowledges how little we know about the effects of
economic structure and policy on preferences, and it erects a barrier both to ad hoc explanation and to
the utopian thinking of those who invoke the mutability of human dispositions in order to sidestep
difficult questions of scarcity and social choice.").
67. See id. at 105 ("Realism, however, cannot be among the virtues invoked on behalf of the
exogenous preferences assumption .... A broader concept of market failure is thus required, one
encompassing the effects of economic policies and institutions on preferences and for this reason more
adequate for the consideration of an appropriate mix of markets, communities, families, and states in
economic governance.").
68. See id. at 102-03.
69. See id. at 104-05.
70. See id. at 104 ("[P]reference endogeneity gives rise to a kind of market failure and suggests a
reconsideration of some aspects of normative economics.").
71. See id. at 102.
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ences into cost-benefit analysis, I would like to first briefly point out a few
practical considerations that may have some significance for making proper use
of the results of the theoretical inquiry. I will then present my theoretical
analysis and conclusions, and later revisit these practical considerations and
discuss the extent to which they may impose limitations upon the use of my
suggested valuation methodology.
1. Practical Considerations in Applying an Endogenous Preferences Valuation
Framework
(i) Under Some Circumstances the Choice Among Alternative Preference Struc-
tures Is Mooted. First, there are some instances where even though a policy
may significantly alter the preference structures of a substantial number of
persons, it will not be necessary for a cost-benefit analyst to choose between
valuations derived from the pre-policy implementation preference structure and
those derived from the post-policy implementation preference structure. This
will be the case whenever the net benefits calculations under either set of
preference structures lead to the same conclusion as to the merits of the policy
at issue relative to those of the other policy alternatives. In other words, if the
valuation calculations are invariant in the sense that they would lead to endorse-
ment (or rejection) of the policy in question relative to the alternatives when
valuations are done with regard to either of these two preference structures, then
the issue is rendered moot and no choice among them need be made.72 For.
example, with regard to advertising expenditures which presumably have at
least some effect in altering consumer preferences as well as providing informa-
tion, it has been argued that it is generally unnecessary to choose between using
pre-advertising preferences or post-advertising preferences in order to value the
effects of the advertising expenditures, because the results will usually not be
significantly affected by the choice.73
As a general matter, however, when there are significant differences in the
contours of the pre-policy implementation and post-policy implementation pref-
erence structures for a substantial number of affected persons, a cost-benefit
analyst might well reach different conclusions as to the relative merits of the
policy in question as compared to the possible alternatives depending upon
72. However, even if all of these preference structures would yield identical policy recommenda-
tions as compared to the merits of the policy alternatives, a person following Cass Sunstein's
paternalistic recommendations might reject all of those preference structures and substitute instead for
valuation purposes another set of preference structures which when used for valuations in the analyst's
opinion better facilitates achieving social welfare. See generally Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 56.
73. Avinash Dixit & Victor Norma, Advertising and Welfare, 9 BELL J. EcON. 1, 2 (1978) ("[Iln
general, advertising that is beneficial at the margin as judged by preadvertising tastes will also be
beneficial according to postadvertising tastes, and advertising that is harmful according to the latter will
also be harmful when judged by the former."). This sweeping claim is certainly a counter-intuitive
result, since one would- expect advertisers to attempt to alter preferences in favor of the advertised
goods and services rather than merely limit themselves to providing information as to their properties
and availability and that such preference-shaping efforts may or may not be successful."
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which set of preference structures was used for valuing the policy's conse-
quences. Under those circumstances, a choice between these preference struc-
tures for valuation purposes will have to be made.
(ii) Preference Structure Estimation Difficulties May Limit the Ability to Imple-
ment the Theoretically Appropriate Valuation Approach. There are generally
difficulties of one sort or another that will be encountered in estimating the
contours of preference structures, particularly with regards to preference struc-
tures that do not yet exist, or no longer exist, at the time of estimation. In
addition, there are differential difficulties encountered in estimating preference
structures depending upon whether the cost-benefit analysis is being undertaken
prospectively in advance of a policy's implementation or is instead being
carried, out retrospectively in order to assess whether a policy that has been
implemented has had the desired results. Let me address each of these problems
in turn.
(a) General Preference Structure Estimation Difficulties
It is of course often difficult even under the conventional simplifying exog-
enous preference assumption for cost-benefit analysts to ascertain the contours
of the applicable preference structures so as to calculate the willingness to
pay-based valuations of the consequences of the policies under consideration.
There is often a lack of the revealed preference data that would be most useful
for ascertaining these preferences, and the various methods used by analysts to
ascertain preferences in the absence of such data are open to criticism. 74 This
problem obviously becomes more severe under endogenous preferences assump-
tions where two or more different preference structures may need to be ascer-
tained. The practical difficulties involved in determining the contours of each of
perhaps several preference structures suggest that it may often be infeasible to
attempt to ascertain the contours of transitional (and perhaps short-lived) prefer-
ence structures, and that the most that can reasonably be accomplished in many
instances would be to estimate only two distinct preference structures-the
pre-policy implementation preference structures and the final stable long-term
post-policy implementation preference structures-and then choose which of
these two preference structures should be utilized to value the policy's conse-
quences. It may even in some instances be impossible to estimate with any real
confidence the post-policy implementation preference structures, forcing the
analyst to in effect make his valuations under an implicit exogenous preference
assumption, even when that assumption is recognized to be false.
74. See, e.g., SutsmN 1993, supra note 26, at 218-20.
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(b) Prospective and Retrospective Cost-Benefit Analyses Present Different"
Kinds of Problems for Determining the Applicable Preference Structures
Another point worth keeping in mind is that the practical difficulties pre-
sented by the need to determine the contours of the relevant preference struc-
tures will be different both in kind and in severity depending on whether the
cost-benefit analysis is being done prospectively or instead retrospectively.
Cost-benefit analyses are most commonly done prospectively as part of the
process of reaching a decision as to whether to implement a particular policy.
Under those circumstances, the pre-policy implementation preference structures
already exist and can ideally be empirically ascertained.75 However, the subse-
quently resulting post-policy implementation preferences structures do not yet
exist before the implementation of the policy. They will have to be projected
solely on the basis of estimates of the impacts that the policy will have on the
pre-policy implementation preference structures. Given our limited understand-
ing of the processes of preference formation and alteration,76 such projections
will be relatively uncertain and subject to additional sources of error that go
beyond the difficulties inherent in ascertaining existing preference structures.
This need to forecast the contours of post-policy implementation preference
structures raises a real concern that an analyst might be tempted to utilize
result-oriented projections of preference structure alterations that are formulated
with the hidden agenda of either favoring or disfavoring the policy at issue.77
Given the inherent uncertainty of such projections of future preference struc-
tures, these kinds of analyst manipulations may be difficult or impossible to
recognize and discredit prior to the implementation of the policy, by which time
it may be too late to effectively revisit the decision.
This practical concern as to the potential for analyst bias that would be
difficult or impossible to police adequately might call for giving relatively
greater weight to valuations derived from the more easily ascertained existing
pre-policy implementation preference structures, and correspondingly giving
relatively lesser weight to the more subjective and uncertain projections of
post-policy implementation preferences structures, than would be justified by
purely theoretical considerations were there not such significant differentials in
the measurement difficulties presented by the need to establish the contours of
the alternative preference structures. In a case where the estimates of post-
policy implementation preference structures are particularly uncertain, this
concern might even justify relying solely upon the pre-policy implementation
preference structures - in effect reimposing the assumption of exogeneity of
preferences for the policy at issue under circumstances where this assumption is
75. At least, in theory, this can be done, although determining the relevant individual preference
structures in the absence of revealed preference data can be very difficult.
76. See Bowles, supra note 22, at 102-03.
77. See id.
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recognized to be false-in order to avoid the possibility of being misled by
analyst bias.
Cost-benefit analyses are, however, sometimes done retrospectively rather
than prospectively in an attempt to determine whether a policy has been
successful in achieving its objectives, though this effort of revisiting policies
with the advantage of hindsight is not undertaken nearly as often as some com-
mentators would prefer.78 Under those retrospective analysis circumstances, the
post-policy implementation preference structures exist at the time at which the
analysis is conducted and can ideally be empirically ascertained. In addition, the
pre-policy implementation preference structures and any transitional preference
structures, while they would no longer exist at the time of the analysis, would
presumably have left some historical record and can be more accurately ascer-
tained than can post-policy implementation preference structures in the prospec-
tive analysis context where they can only be forecast.
This difference in analytical context suggests that there should be somewhat
less concern about the possibility of hidden analyst bias in preference structures
estimation for retrospective cost-benefit analyses than for prospective analyses.
In other words, the differential difficulties presented with regard to establishing
the contours of preference structures that do not exist at the time that the
analysis is conducted are more serious in the prospective cost-benefit analysis
context than they are in the retrospective analysis context. Therefore, the
practical concerns about avoiding potential sources of analyst bias that might
call for giving greater weight to the valuations derived from the pre-policy
implementation preference structures than to those valuations that are derived
from estimated post-policy implementation preference structures in the prospec-
tive analysis context are more significant than are the comparable concerns that
would call for giving greater weight to valuations derived from post-policy
implementation preference structures than to those derived from the pre-policy
implementation preference structures in the retrospective analysis context. It
may, therefore, be the case that the policy Valuations derived from endogenous
preferences assumptions should, under some circumstances, perhaps be calcu-
lated somewhat differently for prospective cost-benefit analyses than for retro-
spective analyses, even absent any theoretical reasons for such disparate
treatment.
2. A Proposed Methodology for Combining Valuations Obtained Through the
Use of Different Preference Structures
To provide a context for my subsequent analysis, I ask the reader to assume
for the sake of argument that a cost-benefit analyst wishes to evaluate the
impacts of a proposed policy, either prospectively or retrospectively, under
circumstances where the policy will have significant effects upon the prefer-
ences of a substantial number of people. In other words, assume that there
78. See, e.g., Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 7, at 77-78.
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initially exists one set of preference structures that characterizes those persons'
pre-policy implementation preferences, but that another and different stable set
of preference structures will characterize those persons' preferences after the
policy has been implemented for some period of time, and perhaps one or even
a series of transitional preference structures will also characterize those persons'
preferences at various times during the transition period to their final stable
post-policy implementation preference structures. Assume also for now that
each of these preference structures can be accurately ascertained so that the
uncertainty of estimation and analyst bias issues discussed above do not arise.
Finally, further assume that one is taking a non-paternalistic stance under which
one is committed to deferring to the extent possible to the preferences of the
affected persons. Given these assumptions, what combination of policy valua-
tions derived from each of these preference structures would be the most
appropriate theoretical framework to use for valuing the policy impacts in
accordance with the underlying willingness to pay principle that essentially
defines cost-benefit analysis?
I have concluded that at least in most instances the post-policy implementa-
tion preference structures should be used to value policy consequences, rather
than the pre-policy implementation preference structures, for both prospective
and retrospective cost-benefit analyses. The most intuitively plausible justifica-
tion for this choice is the obvious fact that the post-policy implementation
preference structures embody the actual preferences that will exist when the
policy consequences are experienced by the affected persons. This justification
is given further support by Dau-Schmidt's argument that to use the pre-policy
implementation preference structures to value those policies that are intended
partially or even primarily to alter preferences would be to completely miss the
point of those policies.
Sunstein, as discussed above, is for various reasons critical of using either
pre-policy implementation or post-policy implementation preference structures
to value policies, but his arguments certainly cannot be read to favor the use of
the pre-policy implementation preference structures over the post-policy imple-
mentation preference structures for making valuations; if anything, they would
suggest the contrary. Neither Becker nor Bowles specifically address this choice
among preference structures for valuation purposes question in their work,
except that Becker briefly notes that "initial preferences should have no priority
over final preferences in welfare analysis when policies change preferences,, 79
and that Bowles notes the potential for analyst bias in the estimation of post-
policy implementation preference structures, an issue I will later address when
considering practical limitations upon the use of an endogenous preferences
valuation methodology.
I offer the "at least in most instances" qualification in my recommendation
above because one can certainly conceive of extreme circumstances where
79. BEcri, supra note 30, at 20.
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valuations that are made solely on the basis of post-policy implementation
preference structures can be criticized as a means of attempting to justify
undesirable policies on the basis of distorted preferences that the policies them-
selves have created.80 As a practical matter, however, most policies do not
appear to directly distort preferences but merely provide more information that
allows people the option to alter their preferences, but does not force them to do
so. I therefore do not think the bootstrapping concern adverted to by Sunstein
significantly undercuts the argument for relying solely upon the post-policy
implementation preference structures for policy valuation in the usual cases.
This approach of using post-policy implementation preference structures to
value policies that alter preferences will tend to favor those environmental
policies and other preference-altering policies for which the post-policy imple-
mentation preference structures are more favorable to the policy in question
when weighing the trade-offs between policy benefits and costs. In some
instances, this effect could be outcome-determinative; a policy option that is
regarded as inferior when assessed by the yardstick of the pre-policy implemen-
tation preference structures may prove to be the preferred alternative when
assessed with regard to the post-policy implementation preference structures. I
have argued in this Article that under these circumstances the latter, more favorable
assessment of the policy in question is the correct cost-benefit assessment.
My decision to endorse the use of the post-policy implementation preference
structures for valuation purposes raises the derivative question as to what
weight to give to transitional preference structures, where they exist, relative to
the final stable post-policy implementation preference structures. My conclusion
here is in general accord with Becker's discussion of the proper roles that
time-discounting and preference structure duration should play in policy valua-
tion and should be relatively uncontroversial. Policy consequences that occur
while transitional preference structures exist should be valued on the basis of
those transitional preference structures and then time-discounted to a present
value based on when those consequences occur. Once the final stable post-
policy implementation preference structures have come into existence, all subse-
quent policy consequences should be valued in accordance with those preference
structures and then time-discounted to a present value as appropriate.
Under this discounting approach, the longer a transitional set of preference
structures exists, other things being equal, the more weight they will be given in
the overall policy valuation. This seems most sensible. In addition, the time-
discounting applied to the valuations derived from each of the applicable
post-policy implementation preference structures to convert them all to present
80. One can imagine extreme examples of this situation. Would anyone accept as a justification for
imposing forced lobotomies on people the fact that post-lobotomy, those persons seemed content with
their new lot in life? As a less extreme example, a policy that facilitated access to addictive drugs might
well be favorably regarded by subsequent addicts who had initially opposed those policies pre-
addiction. Should the valuations by the addicts then be regarded as definitive as to the value of the
addictive drug access policy?
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value terms will render those valuations commensurate for the purpose of
aggregation into an overall policy valuation.
This endogenous preferences valuation framework that I recommend here on
theoretical grounds may, however, need to be practically modified in some
instances to reflect the preference structure estimation difficulties and potential
analyst biases that I have discussed above. I will address these issues in the next
subsection of this Article.
3. Recognizing Practical Limitations on an Endogenous Preferences Valuation
Methodology
As noted above, there may sometimes be severe difficulties involved in
estimating the contours of transitional preference structures. In such instances, it
may be necessary as a practical matter to make the simplifying assumption that
the final stable post-policy implementation preference structures will immedi-
ately come into existence upon the implementation of the policy. In those
instances where the transitional preference structures are short-lived or where
they do not differ significantly from the final stable post-policy implementation
preference structures, or both, this simplifying assumption is unlikely to intro-
duce significant error into the valuation calculations.
Most cost-benefit analyses are done prospectively, and in some instances the
analyst may unfortunately not only be unable to determine the contours of any
transitional preference structures, but also unable to estimate with any confi-
dence even the contours of the final stable post-policy implementation prefer-
ence structures. Under these circumstances, there is no ideal way to proceed,
and a difficult choice is presented as to the best analytical approach.
One could direct the analyst to proceed with the policy valuation exercise on
the basis of the pre-policy implementation preference structures, assuming that
they can be empirically ascertained with reasonable accuracy, essentially utiliz-
ing the exogenous preferences framework in a situation where this assumption
is known or at least believed to be inaccurate. On the other hand, one could
direct the analyst to persevere with the endogenous preferences valuation
approach in the face of this difficulty and use the best estimate of the post-
policy implementation preference structure(s) that she can ascertain. This latter
tact of course raises the possibility that the analyst may incorporate into the
cost-benefit analysis biased estimates of these preference structures that are
designed to justify a particular result that she favors, and that will be difficult or
impossible for others to recognize as such and criticize. This problem of
potential and effectively unreviewable analyst bias will, as previously dis-
cussed, be much less of a concern in the retrospective cost-benefit analysis
context where the post-policy implementation preference structures exist and
can presumably be empirically estimated with some reasonable accuracy, and
where there is no need under my suggested valuation approach to undertake the
more difficult exercise of estimating the contours of the former pre-policy
implementation preference structures on the basis of historical evidence.
THE ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
D. Conclusions Regarding Incorporating Endogeneity of Preferences
Cost-benefit analysis is the most important policy evaluation technique now
used in American public sector decision making. It is therefore crucial that these
analyses be properly conducted. The conventional assumption made by cost-
benefit analysts, usually implicitly rather than explicitly, 8' is that individual
preference structures are not altered by any of the policies that are under
consideration. This simplifying exogenous preferences assumption is not always
satisfied, however, and in some instances the preference structures of a substan-
tial proportion of the people who are impacted by a policy are endogenous in
that they are also significantly altered by that policy. Under those endogenous
preferences circumstances, an important question is presented as to whether
valuations of the impacts of the policies called for by the cost-benefit methodol-
ogy based on willingness to pay, should be calculated with regard to the
pre-policy implementation preference structures, or instead with regard to the
different post-policy implementation preference structures, including any transi-
tional preference structures that may exist for a period of time, or perhaps with
regard to some combination of the above.
Several prominent scholars have previously addressed aspects of this inquiry,
including most importantly Gary Becker, Cass Sunstein, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt,
and Samuel Bowles. While each of those writers has made a substantial
contribution to the effort, the endogenous preferences valuation question has not
yet been definitively resolved and virtually all cost-benefit analysts continue to
ignore the implications of the possibility of endogenous preferences in their
work.8 2 In this Article I have assessed the merits of Becker's extended utility
function valuation approach, and of the various valuation suggestions offered by
Sunstein, Dau-Schmidt, and Bowles. Within a framework of hopefully reason-
able assumptions that I have made as to the ability of analysts to ascertain the
contours of preference structures, I have offered my own thoughts regarding
how the endogenous preferences valuation problem can be best addressed in a
non-paternalistic fashion.
My main conclusion is that the willingness to pay-based valuations of
policies provided by cost-benefit analyses should be derived solely from the
post-policy implementation preference structures, as a general matter. If there
are any transitional preferences structures, they should also be used to value
those policy consequences that occur while those transitional preference struc-
tures are in existence. This valuation framework recognizes the important fact
that post-policy implementation preferences are the actual preferences that will
exist when the policy consequences are experienced by the affected persons,
recognizes that many policies will alter and are even designed to alter prefer-
ences, and gives proper weight to the timing of policy consequences and the
duration of various post-policy implementation preference structures.
81. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 33.
82. Id.
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This recommended cost-benefit valuation framework will be more favorable
to those environmental and other policies that have as one of their consequences
the alteration of preferences in a manner that favors the policy at issue, and in
my opinion that favoritism is justified for the reasons discussed above. As I
have also discussed, however, this theoretical endogenous preferences valuation
framework may need to be modified at times to accommodate preference structure
estimation difficulties and to counter potential analyst bias, particularly with regard to
prospective cost-benefit analyses. My hope is that cost-benefit analysts will come to
recognize the shortcomings of invariably assuming that preferences are exogenous
with regard to the policies under consideration, and will give more thought to ways of
incorporating preference endogeneity into their analyses.
II. Tm ENDOGENEITY OF IDENTITY PROBLEM
A. A General Introduction
While the possible endogeneity of preferences presents significant problems
for cost-benefit analysis, endogeneity of identity poses a far more serious and
perhaps even fatal challenge to that methodology. The nature and severity of
this problem is even less widely appreciated by analysts than is the endogeneity
of preferences problem.
In my previous work I have referred to the fact that the fundamental genetic
identities of the members of future generations are impacted by the current
social polices that we pursue-in other words, that their fundamental identities
are not exogenous to those policies, but are endogenously determined by
them-as the "problem of person-altering consequences."83 I will continue to
use that phrase to describe the endogeneity of identity problem in this Article. I
will discuss the nature of these person-altering consequences in detail below.
For now let me merely state succinctly that what I am referring to by this phrase
is the fact that the outcome of a successful act of human reproduction is
radically contingent. Which particular one of the hundreds of millions of sperm
that are released in an ejaculation will unite with the female egg, if any, is a
very uncertain event. Even the slightest difference in the timing or any other
aspects of a reproductively successful act of intercourse will almost certainly
lead to a different sperm-egg fusion, and therefore ultimately to the birth of a
genetically different individual than would otherwise have been born. The
person now conceived and born will be a different individual in the most
fundamental genetic sense.
The consequences of this simple fact are momentous. Any social policy that
is significant enough in its direct or indirect impact on human behavior to lead
to even a single different sperm-egg fusion taking place will create a genetically
different individual than the person that would have been born absent the
implementation of the policy. Even the most minor and local policy will surely
83. Crespi 2008, supra note 25; Crespi 2007, supra note 25.
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have that much impact on someone's behavior. Over time, as that genetically
different individual is born and matures, and over their life influences numerous
other people in major or minor ways, this will result in an exponentially
spreading cascade of fundamental genetic changes in the population of individu-
als subsequently conceived. After a relatively short transitional period, in a
historical sense, the identity of all individuals that are conceived and born over
the rest of eternity will be fundamentally different from who they would have
been in the absence of the policy.
In other words, one dramatic impact of any significant policy measure will be
the elimination of all members of the population of distant future generations
that would have been conceived and born absent the policy, and their replace-
ment by an entirely different group of people. Yet another way to describe the
situation in more technical economic language is to say that we face a pervasive
endogeneity of identity problem. The identity of future persons is not deter-
mined exogenously, but is instead determined after a transitional period of time
endogenous to the policies pursued. These person-altering consequences would,
from the perspective of the affected individuals, completely dwarf in signifi-
cance the combined effect of all other policy consequences.
In conventional cost-benefit analyses these important endogenous person-
altering consequences are invariably overlooked.84 The typical cost-benefit analyst
calculates both the benefits and the costs of the policy at issue by the willingness to
pay of the affected persons, as compared to the reference point of a hypothetical,
counterfactual baseline scenario of a world in which the exact same persons exist but
without the policy's impacts. This procedure is tantamount to an implicit assump-
tion that personal identity is exogenous; that the same future population of individuals
will exist whether or not the policy is implemented. Such an assumption is not merely
implausible but is demonstrably false, and is equivalent to simply ignoring those
person-altering consequences. The calculation of costs and benefits relative to an
unachievable and thus meaningless baseline reference scenario renders the conclu-
sions of such an analysis essentially irrelevant to the real choices at hand among the
actual consequences that are possible to achieve through the alternative policies under
consideration.
It might at first appear that this analytical problem could be solved simply by
more realistically specifying the hypothetical baseline scenario used as a refer-
ence point for valuing the impacts of the policy at issue. This baseline scenario
could be specified in a manner that recognizes that different future persons
would exist were the policy to be implemented, and generate its pervasive and
eventually universal person-altering consequences, than were the policy not to
be implemented. The valuations then would be done in a more accurate fashion
that took into account these endogenous person-altering consequences that
would ensue if the policy were implemented. Unfortunately, further reflection
suggests that the problem is not so easily fixable.
84. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 33.
20101
120 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
The basic analytical conundrum presented is that if one attempts to so incorporate
these person-altering consequences into a cost-benefit analysis, rather than simply
ignoring them, the valuation calculations become so unwieldy and imprecise as to
essentially be indeterminate. As I will discuss below, it then becomes difficult (if not
impossible) to avoid the conclusion that any policy option that is pursued will
generate massive (if not infinite) aggregate future net benefits of very uncertain
magnitude, relative to the appropriately specified baseline scenario, even if these
future benefits are time-discounted at relatively high discount rates. Such a sweeping
conclusion that massive future benefits of highly uncertain magnitude will likely
result no matter which course of action is pursued seems intuitively implausible, to
say the least. It certainly does not provide meaningful guidance to policymakers for
discriminating among alternative courses of action.
Once a cost-benefit analyst eats of the apple of the tree of knowledge, i.e.,
recognizes that all policies have pervasive and eventually universal and eternal
person-altering consequences, she is put into in a real bind with no good choices
available within this methodological framework. Continuing to ignore those
consequences, given their overwhelming significance to the persons affected,
would disregard the willingness to pay valuation principle that underlies the
cost-benefit approach, and is no longer an option if one wants to reach results
that are relevant to the actual choices at hand. However, once one incorporates
those person-altering consequences into the analysis, there does not appear to be
any way to meaningfully estimate in a willingness to pay-based manner and
then compare the size of the massive benefits to future generations that would
result under each of the various policy options so as to provide useful guidance.
The problem is fundamental since cost-benefit analysis is simply the systematic
application to decision making of the basic willingness to pay valuation principle of
welfare economics, which is in turn logically derived by straightforward reasoning
from conventional and widely embraced secular, consequentialist ethical premises.85
In light of the seemingly insurmountable problems that the willingness to pay-based
valuation framework faces in meaningfully assessing the significance of person-
altering consequences, it may simply be the case that cost-benefit analysis should no
85. By the phrase "secular premises" I refer to ethical premises that are derived from reflections on
the human condition that are agnostic with regard to the existence of a supreme supernatural being of
ethical relevance. I will not address in this Article the difficult question as to whether there is a
sufficient basis in one or more of the mainstream religious traditions for recognizing an ethical
obligation to the members of distant future generations. By the phrase "consequentialist premises" I
refer to the ethical premise that actions have ethical relevance only to the extent that they have
consequences for the rights or interests of specific persons, and that actions have no ethical relevance in
and of themselves apart from those consequences. I will consider briefly in Part l.C. of this Article
whether there exist any sufficient secular but non-consequentialist grounds for asserting that we have
any ethical obligations to the members of distant future generations, or to the human race as a whole,
that exist apart from any ethical obligations grounded in the consequences of our conduct for specific
persons. However, my arguments in this Article are addressed primarily to the relatively narrow yet
practically quite important question as to whether and if so how cost-benefit analyses that are based
upon conventional secular and consequentialist ethical premises should be conducted if one wishes to
incorporate person-altering consequences into those assessments.
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longer be regarded as a useful analytical tool.86 If one cannot reach meaningful
conclusions and policy recommendations solely on the basis of conventional ethical
premises and their willingness to pay-based valuation corollary, then analytical efforts
may henceforth have to incorporate a broader range of non-consequentialist or even
theistic normative criteria as alternative or supplementary bases for offering recommen-
dations to policymakers.87 This is a rather troubling thought, since once one goes
beyond giving weight only to the policy impacts upon specific individuals as mea-
sured by their willingness to pay any consensus as to the appropriate evaluative
criteria to apply will be most difficult to achieve.
In the remainder of Part I of this Article I will proceed as follows. In
Part IIILB below I will explain in more detail what I mean by the phrase "person-
altering consequences." In Part llI.C I will discuss the serious problems encoun-
tered in attempting to incorporate person-altering consequences into cost-benefit
analyses in the conventional willingness to pay manner. I will then discuss a
couple of alternative ways that one might attempt to incorporate those conse-
quences into the cost-benefit valuations in a meaningful fashion that still
respects the willingness to pay principle, and will point out the serious shortcom-
ings of each of these efforts that renders them inadequate responses to the
problem. I will then offer a few preliminary thoughts regarding what new nor-
mative criteria might be utilized to assess policy impacts upon future genera-
tions, and how the conclusions reached through application of those criteria might be
combined with the willingness to pay-based valuations of policy impacts upon
existing persons. Part 111.D will present a brief and rather pessimistic overall conclu-
sion regarding the viability of the cost-benefit methodology in light of this problem
even if it is so augmented with additional normative criteria.
B. The Problem of Person-Altering Consequences
The noted British philosopher Derek Parfit first articulated in 197688 a simple
yet profound insight that philosophers have since labeled "the Non-Identity
86. Such analyses may, however, continue to have considerable utility as persuasive rhetorical
devices when addressing audiences that are not sophisticated enough to recognize how much the
validity of the cost-benefit methodology is undercut by the pervasiveness of person-altering conse-
quences, whether or not those consequences are taken into account.
87. I have addressed more fully the ethical implications of the problem of person-altering conse-
quences, and the application of this line of thought to major environmental policy decisions such as
radioactive waste disposal approaches and global warming mitigation efforts, in Crespi 2007, supra
note 25; see also Crespi 2008, supra note 25. I also address in Crespi 2008 to a minor extent the cost-
benefit analysis concerns presented by this problem that are discussed more fully in this Article. Crespi
2008, supra note 25, at 10885-86.
88. Derek Parfit, On Doing the Best for Our Children, in ETHics AND PopuL.ATIoN 100-15 (Michael Bayles,
ed. 1976) [hereinafter Parfit 1976]. Gregory Kavka argues that Parfit's insight was also discovered indepen-
dently at approximately the same time by Robert Adams and Thomas Schwartz. Gregory S. Kavka, The
Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHuL. & PuB. Art. 93-112 (1982) (citing Robert M. Adams, Existence,
Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil, 13 Nous 53 (1979), and also citing Thomas Schwartz, Obligations to
Posterity, in OBUGATIONS To FtrrRE GENRenAnoNs 3-13 (Richard Sikora & Brian Barry, eds., 1978). Parfit
further discusses his insights in Derek Parfit, Future Generations, Further Problems, 11 PinL. & Pun. AFF. 113,
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Problem," 89 and which I will refer to in this Article as either the problem of
endogeneity of identity or the problem of person-altering consequences. 9° This
insight calls into serious question whether we have any ethical obligations at all
to distant future generations that can be justified on the basis of conventional
secular, consequentialist ethical premises.9 ' It also renders inadequate any analytical
efforts that overlook those consequences, even though, as I will discuss below, it is
difficult if not impossible to conduct meaningful cost-benefit analyses that do incorpo-
rate those consequences. While this problem has fostered substantial (though incon-
clusive) discussion among philosophers and other scholars over the last three decades
at an abstract, academic level regarding its ethical significance,92 its dramatic practical
implications for policymakers in general and cost-benefit analysts in particular have
not yet been adequately addressed.9 3
115-17 (1982) [hereinafter Parfit 1982], in DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-80 (1984) [hereinafter
PARFrr 1984], and in Derek Parfit, Comments, 96 ETHICS 832 (1986) [hereinafter Parfit 1986].
89. Parfit later labeled this problem as the "Non-Identity Problem," PARtrr 1984, supra note 88, at
378, and it is generally so described by other academic philosophers. See, e.g., Doran Smolkin, Towards
a Rights-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem, 30 J. Soc. PiL. 194, 194 (1999); David
Wasserman, The Nonidentity Problem, Disability, and the Role Morality of Prospective Parents, 116
ETHICS 132 (2005). The problem also is described by some other scholars as the "Parfit Paradox." See,
e.g., Kavka, supra note 88, at 95 ("[Parfit's] argument poses a... Paradox of Future Individuals");
Edith Brown Weiss, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global
Environmental Responsibility: Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment,
84 AM .J. INT'L. L. 198, 204 (1990) (referring to this insight as "Derek Parfit's famous paradox");
Lothar Gundling, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global
Environmental Responsibility: Our Responsibility to Future Generations, 84 AM .J. INT'L. L. 207, 210
(1990) (referring to this insight as "Parfit's paradox"). Those scholars who regard Parfit's insight as
posing a paradox commonly state the question that he poses along the lines of "How can we owe a duty
to future persons if the very act of discharging that duty wipes out the very individuals to whom we
allegedly owe that duty?" See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to
the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility: Do We Owe a Duty to Future
Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 190, 191 (1990). I prefer to pose
the problem as a non-paradoxical though difficult question of determining the ethical implications of
policies that have among their other long-term effects pervasive person-altering consequences; the
elimination of the existence of all yet-unborn future persons who would have been born absent the
policy's impacts, and the birth instead of a different set of future persons.
90. In my opinion, Parfit's own "Non-Identity Problem" label is more apt then the "Parfit Paradox"
label because the question is not really a paradox so much as it is a conceptual problem regarding the
existence of ethical obligations. However, Parfit's label obscures somewhat the precise nature of the
problem for those who are not academic philosophers and are not familiar with the problem and the
body of scholarship that it has engendered. I therefore will use in this Article the more straightforward
descriptive phrases "endogeneity of identity" or "person-altering consequences."
91. See supra note 85.
92. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 88; Schwartz, supra note 88; Kavka, supra note 88, James
Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 Erncs 804-31 (1986); Smolkin, supra note 89.
93. But see Crespi 2007, supra note 25, where I have attempted to contribute to such a fuller
assessment. There is a legal literature of modest size and scope that addresses some of the implications
of the problem of person-altering consequences, but that literature fails to fully incorporate the insights
of the philosophers who have addressed the matter. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Justice Unconceived:
How Posterity Has Rights, 14 YALE J. L. & HutnmAN. 393, 397 (2002) ("[T]he topic of future generations'
rights has spawned a growing literature-or, rather, at least two separate literatures, one in law and the
other in philosophy, with very little interaction between the two."). Most of the relevant legal literature
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In this Article I will not attempt to fully articulate or resolve the complex
philosophical arguments that have been offered regarding the problem of person-
altering consequences, although I will reference much of that literature for those
philosophically-oriented readers who wish to later explore this problem in a
more rigorous and systematic fashion.9 4 I will instead discuss the problem in a
more condensed and straightforward manner that is intended to be helpful to
academics in other fields and practicing lawyers who are not deeply versed in
these technical philosophical debates, but who nevertheless wish to better
understand the nature of the problem of person-altering consequences and its
implications for practical policy making, particularly with regard to its implica-
tions for the conduct and relevance of cost-benefit analyses.
Parfit has clearly been the primary instigator of and contributor to discussions
of the difficulties involved in assessing the person-altering consequences of
policies through several works that he published over the 1976-1986 decade.
95
The most significant of these efforts were his seminal 1976 article 96 and his
focuses on the specific person-altering consequences issues raised by assisted reproductive technolo-
gies; whether persons born with birth defects as a result of such technologies but whowould not have
otherwise born have standing to claim that they were thereby injured by a "wrongful life" tort. See, e.g.,
Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YAIu HuM. RTs. & DEv. L. J. 1 (2007); John A.
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 Am. J. L. & MED. 7
(2004); Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (2002); Phillip G.
Peters, Harming Future Persons: Obligations to the Children of Reproductive Technology, 8 S. CAL.
INTERDIsc. L. J. 375 (1999); Michael Laudor, In Defense of Wrongful Life: Bringing Political Theory to
the Defense of a Tort, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1675 (1994). There are only a few articles in the legal
literature that consider the significance of person-altering consequences in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations,
22 J. L. & POLTICS 183 (2006) (considering the significance of person-altering consequences for the
validity of the claims made by the descendants of slaves for reparations payments); Lukas H. Meyer,
The Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return: Theoretical Perspectives: Historical Injustice and
the Right of Return, 5 TRmoRETIcAL INQ. L. 305 (2004) (considering the significance of person-altering
consequences for the validity of the claims made by the descendants of displaced Palestinian refugees
for a right to return to their ancestral homeland). I am not aware of any prior attempts to more broadly
assess the significance of person-altering consequences for the conduct and relevance of cost-benefit
analysis in all contexts whatsoever, although Douglas Kysar has recently recognized that those
consequences do pose "deep conceptual challenges" to any analytical method such as cost-benefit
analysis "that is framed in terms of the rights, preferences, or interests of particular individuals." Kysar,
supra note 8, at 37.
Two other prominent law professors who have addressed the problem of person-altering conse-
quences at least tangentially in their work are Daniel Farber and Jeffrey Gaba. Daniel A. Farber, From
Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future Generations, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 289, 302 n.69 (2003)
(citing quotes made by Derek Parfit on this topic); DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING
SENSImLE ENvIRoNMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 151 n.38 (1999) at (same); Jeffrey M.
Gaba, Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to Future Generations: Future Rights and
Present Virtue, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 258 n.24 (1999).
94. See Crespi 2007, supra note 25, for a more comprehensive review of this literature.
95. Parfit 1976, supra note 88; Parfit 1982, supra note 88; PARmT 1984, supra note 88; Parfit 1986,
supra note 88.
96. Parfit 1976, supra note 88. In this 1976 essay Parfit uses the hypothetical situation of a woman
deciding whether to postpone becoming pregnant until she recovers from an illness that would result in
any child conceived being born with a handicap to illustrate the person-altering consequences of a
decision for persons who as a result will now not be born. Id. at 100-01. Parfit notes that if the
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more comprehensive 1984 book REASONS AND PERSONS, 97 but he has also made
other contributions to this debate.98 Parfit's seminal insight is that virtually any
pregnancy is postponed and her child is later conceived after the illness is cured, the child that would
initially have been born will not now be born without the handicap, but instead will never be born at all.
Id. at 101. It is instead someone else with a different genetic endowment that will be born without the
handicap.
Whether a handicapped child is better off for not being born is an impossible question to answer in
abstract, general terms. It seems plausible that most if not all handicapped persons would prefer their
lives to nonexistence, particularly if the handicaps are of lesser severity. A mother who decides to
become pregnant while suffering such an illness and who therefore bears a handicapped child cannot be
criticized on the basis of the consequences for the child unless we assume that the child would have
preferred nonexistence to being born. Id. Such a sweeping and counterintuitive assumption about the
nature of the preferences of future persons is unwarranted. Similarly, it is far more plausible that future
people would prefer existence even with severe environmental constraints to nonexistence.
To illustrate the effects of policies with person-altering consequences on people who will be born as a
result Parfit in this Article poses the hypothetical situation of a policy measure that would have only
positive effects upon existing persons, but that would also have very adverse effects for future persons.
Id. at 101-02. He notes that absent the implementation of the policy those particular future persons
would never have been born, and argues that they would prefer living subject to the adverse effects of
the policy at issue to the alternative of never having been born. Id.
97. PARFIT 1984, supra note 88. Parfit once again revisited the questions posed by person-altering
consequences in this comprehensive 1984 book, now for the first time labeling the issue the "Non-
Identity Problem," id. at 378 ("This problem arises because, in the different outcomes, different people
would exist. I therefore call this the Non-Identity Problem."), and devoting an entire chapter to its
analysis, id. at 351-379, that drew heavily upon his earlier 1982 article, PARFrr 1984, supra note 88.
After an extended analysis of numerous hypothetical situations Parfit concludes by reasserting his
position that a policy that has person-altering consequences will not be worse for those persons thereby
born as a result of the policy than would be their nonexistence should the policy not have been
implemented. Id. at 378.
Parfit takes in this book what he labels the "No Difference View;" the claim that although a policy
will have person-altering consequences and therefore will not be worse for any specific individual it
still could be judged to be undesirable on moral grounds. Person-altering consequences that make a
policy worse for no one ultimately make no difference in a moral evaluation of that policy. Id. at
366-71. He also concludes his chapter on the Non-Identity Problem by reaffirming his earlier broad,
aspirational claim first made in his 1982 Article, Parfit 1982, supra note 88, at 169-72, that it may be
possible to formulate a valuation approach that appropriately addresses the problem of person-altering
consequences, and which can justify moral condemnation even of policies that hurt no one. PARmrr
1984, supra note 88 at 377-79. He generically labels this approach "Theory X," id. at 378, and states
that he will later in the book attempt to formulate such a theory. Id. at 379 ("In what follows I will try to
find Theory X."). He predicts once again that this criterion will not be based upon an assessment of
whether its consequences are good or bad for affected future persons. Id. His final and more pessimistic
conclusion at the end of this book, however, is that he has again failed to formulate an approach that
adequately addresses the problem of moral evaluation in the context of person-altering consequences
without creating other difficulties that render the approach unacceptable, although he still optimistically
believes that it might yet be possible to do so. "Though I failed to discover X, I believe that, if they
tried, others could succeed." Id. at 443.
Parfit notes several properties that his envisioned "Theory X" would have to satisfy to be an adequate
ethical approach: 'Theory X must solve the Non-Identity Problem, avoid the Repugnant and Absurd
Conclusions, and solve the Mere Addition Paradox. I failed to find a theory that can meet these four
requirements." Id. at 443. "Most of us would believe that the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions are
what I have called them. Until we know how to avoid both conclusions, and how to solve both the
Non-Identity Problem and the Mere Addition Paradox, we will have beliefs that we cannot justify, and
that we know to be inconsistent." Id. at 452.
98. Parfit 1982, supra note 88; Parfit 1986, supra note 88. Parfit later revisited the questions posed
by the person-altering consequences of policies that he had first raised in his original 1976 article in a
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human action, however slight its impacts, is likely to have at least minor effects
on the timing of or other circumstances surrounding some acts of sexual re-
production, leading to different sperm-egg fertilizations than would otherwise
have taken place, and consequently will over time lead to exponentially cascad-
ing consequences of a person-altering nature as now genetically different in-
dividuals mature and reproduce and in other ways influence the sexual behavior
of a broader and broader circle of people. 99 After probably no more than a few
decades at the most this will lead to the entire human population for all eternity
now being composed of individuals that each have significantly different genetic
endowments from those persons that would have existed absent that initial policy
action.'0° The policy will thus have changed the core identity of all of those future
persons; they will be different people in the most fundamental genetic sense.
later 1982 article, Parfit 1982, supra note 88, that was written as a companion piece to a shorter article
on the topic by Gregory Kavka, Kavka, supra note 88, that Parfit's 1976 essay had helped to inspire.
Kavka, supra note 88, at 93. After a long and detailed analysis of the problem, and of Kavka's modified
Kantian categorical imperative-type proposals for addressing it, Parfit once again concluded that
policies with person-altering consequences simply cannot be properly evaluated on the basis of whether
the results of those policies are better or worse for the rights or interests of future persons. Parfit 1982,
supra note 88 at 171-72. He again argued that "some new principle of beneficence" not yet identified
that is not based on those person-affecting considerations will be needed to judge the merits of such
policies. Id. He closed by stating that while it would be quite difficult to formulate such a new principle,
it would be hasty to conclude that it was impossible to do so, because "non-religious moral philosophy
is a very young subject." Id. at 172.
Parfit's 1986 ETmIcs article, Parfit 1986, supra note 88, was included in an ETmIcs symposium issue
focusing on his 1984 book REAsONs AND PERsoNs, and which also included contributions by Brian
Barry, Susan Wolf, Bart Schultz, Shelly Kagan, Bart Gruzalski, Arthur Kuflik and James Woodward.
Parfit 1986, supra note 88. In that article Parfit responded in detail to each of the other symposium
contributors' comments on his 1984 book. In particular, Parfit responded in some detail to James
Woodward's article, Woodward, supra note 92, at 804-31 that specifically focused on the Non-Identity
Problem. Parfit 1986, supra note 88 at 854-62. He there reaffirmed his longstanding "No Difference
View" conclusion, most fully articulated in PARmrr 1984, supra note 88, at 366-71, that despite the fact
that policies with adverse long-term consequences will not make things worse for any particular future
individuals because of those policies' person-altering consequences, there are still moral reasons for not
choosing such policies, Parfit 1986, supra note 88 at 854, and that these moral reasons are just as strong
in spite of the fact that no particular individuals are harmed by such policies, id. at 855-56. Parfit once
again conceded, however, that he was unable to formulate the needed "new theory about beneficence"
that would justify this conclusion. Id. at 854.
99. See D'Amato, supra, note 88, at 190-92, for fuller elaboration of this point.
100. Id. at 191. How rapidly the person-altering consequences of a policy will proliferate, and how
quickly the genetic divergence will be large enough to be of major significance to the personal identities
of the persons affected, will differ from policy to policy. The identity of future persons will begin to be
altered approximately nine months after the implementation of a policy once persons conceived after
the policy's implementation begin to be born (I am classifying those persons conceived before a policy
is implemented but perhaps affected in uterus by its consequences as "existing persons" with regard to
that policy). One would expect that given the obvious sensitivity of the forming of a particular
sperm-egg fusion to a great multitude of circumstances that the scope of the person-altering conse-
quences of a policy would expand with exponential rapidity once some genetically altered individuals
are born, and that even relatively isolated human communities would be impacted and then completely
transformed within a few years or at most a few decades. In addition, while the initial genetic al-
terations resulting may in some instances be relatively minor in impact (eye color, "junk" DNA changes, etc.),
arguably leaving unaffected the "identity" of the persons genetically altered in such minor fashion, the
number of genetic alterations per person will also exponentially increase over time through the same
2010]
126 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
Personal identity is thus in all instances an endogenous variable. Put another
way, one rather dramatic consequence of any policy measure, even one of rather
limited and localized initial impact, is that over the longer-term it will eliminate
the coming into existence of many and eventually all future individuals1"1 who
would otherwise have been conceived and born. It will result instead in the
conception and birth of an increasingly and eventually entirely genetically dif-
ferent group of people,102 with their genetic endowments also increasingly di-
verging from those of the persons who would otherwise have been born.
10 3
Thus, the policy will fundamentally alter the personal identities of all members
of distant future generations; one vast group of potential persons will now never
be conceived and will be replaced by an entirely different group of individuals.
From the perspective of those affected persons, both those who will now be
conceived and born as a consequence of the policy, and those who as another
consequence of the policy will now never come into existence, there could not
be a more dramatic impact. Therefore, these consequences-as well as the other
consequences of a policy-need to be taken into account in any comprehensive
assessment of its merits, whether that assessment is done through the cost-
benefit methodology or otherwise.
As a matter of scientific fact,10 4 Parfit's insight is correct and exemplifies
what is commonly referred to as the "butterfly effect" of chaos theory, 0 5 where
small perturbations in initial conditions can lead to massive overall systemic
effects. Parfit was primarily concerned in his philosophical work on person-
altering consequences with assessing their ethical implications, which he under-
standably found to be quite disturbing. 106 In this Article, however, I will address
cumulative feedback process, rapidly leading to unarguable fundamental alterations in identity of all
future persons.
101. There will be a post-policy "transitional period" starting approximately nine months after the
implementation of a policy during which some, but not all, individuals born will have their fundamental
genetic identities altered by the a policy's consequences, before the person-altering consequences are of
universal scope. The length of such a transitional period, and the proportion of individuals born with
fundamentally altered identities at each point in time during this transitional period, will presumably
vary from policy to policy.
102. See D'Amato, supra note 89, at 191.
103. Not only will the proportion of births that are policy-altered increase over time after the
implementation of the policy, but the cumulative magnitude of the genetic alterations for typical
individuals will also increase over time as the policy's person-altering consequences become more
widely manifested and reinforce one another.
104. See D'Amato, supra note 89, at 192. This conclusion assumes, of course, that a person's
identity is determined by their genetic endowment and/or by the physical and cultural circumstances of
their lives, rather than determined by some kind of ethereal Cartesian ego or "soul" that is wholly
independent of genetic characteristics or physical or cultural influences. I will assume for the purposes
of this Article that if the genetic endowment of a person is significantly altered as a consequence of a
policy this can be regarded as a change in that person's fundamental identity, whereas any consequence
of a policy that does not significantly alter a person's genetic endowment, no matter how significant that
consequence otherwise is to that person's life, does not change the fundamental identity of that person.
105. See, e.g., id. at 190-92.
106. Parfit himself is obviously most uncomfortable with the unavoidable implication of his insight
that current policies that favor existing persons but that have adverse or even disastrous impacts upon
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those ethical implications only tangentially, and will focus instead upon the
implications of person-altering consequences for the conduct and relevance of
cost-benefit analysis of policy options.
C. The Implications of Person-Altering Consequences for Cost-Benefit Analysis
1. Applying Standard Cost-Benefit Valuation Techniques to Assess
Person-Altering Consequences
It is immediately apparent that to evaluate the merits of a policy that will
have person-altering consequences-which I would argue includes any policy
whatsoever given the inevitability of exponentially spreading genetic conse-
quences from even initially very minor effects-through a cost-benefit analysis,
it will not be adequate merely to apply a time discount to the policy's future
impacts, as is now done under the conventional implicit assumption embodied
by the usual specification of the hypothetical baseline scenario that the policy
will not alter the preferences nor the identities of future individuals, but will
only affect their wealth in some fashion. Person-altering consequences will have
to be explicitly incorporated in some manner. The justifications generally
offered for discounting future impacts at an appropriate discount rate are not
affected by inclusion of these consequences,1"7 but it is now also necessary to
sharply differentiate between the policy's future impacts upon existing per-
sons10 8 over the rest of their post-policy implementation lives, which do not
future persons would nevertheless be regarded as beneficial by those future persons relative to their
alternative of nonexistence if the policy is not pursued, and thus those policies cannot be criticized on
the usual person-affecting basis that they would injure particular people.
[T]he long-term effects of social policies, even if clearly disastrous-even if it clearly affects
for the worse-won't be worse for particular people. They are thus ignored by our princi-
ple.... We might claim that we should grant less weight to the further future.... But a
'person-affecting' principle gives to the further future no weight.
This seems indefensible.
Parfit 1976, supra note 88, at 102. Parfit thus demonstrates that he understands the serious problem
posed by person-altering consequences for any utilitarian criterion or related measure such as the
Kaldor-Hicks wealth-maximization criterion that attempts to aggregate in some fashion the impacts of
policies upon the affected persons. "Such difficulties [posed by person-altering consequences] may
seem to face only utilitarians. This is not so. They face most of those who give any weight to a util-
itarian principle." Id. at 100. He is unfortunately somewhat opaque in this brief 1976 essay regarding
how this problem should be resolved. He rejects the alternative of simply ignoring the exponentially
cascading person-altering consequences that will generally occur when a policy is implemented,
particularly given that the total number of future persons that would be born will also likely be affected
as well as their individual identities. Id. at 103. He does state that the problem of person-altering
consequences implies that the long-term consequences of policies should not be determined by their
impacts upon the rights and interests of the affected future persons, id. at 102, but he does not offer an
alternative valuation method.
107. I will not in this Article address the question of whether discounting the future impacts of a
policy is appropriate, or if so how the appropriate discount rate should be ascertained. For discussion of
these issues, see generally Revesz, supra note 15.
108. By the term "existing persons" I mean to refer broadly to not only those persons who are
already born at the time of the policy in question's implementation, but also those persons already
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include person-altering consequences, and the policy's impacts upon future
persons, °9 which will include those consequences.
One must initially recognize that there are two distinct groups of future
persons that will be affected in fundamentally different ways by the person-
altering consequences of a policy. There is, first of all, the very large group of
future persons who will be conceived and born over the subsequent course of
history as a result of those consequences. For them, the implementation of the
policy is a necessary condition of their existence. Second, there is the vastly
larger group of what I will here refer to as "potential but now never to be
conceived future persons" who would have been conceived and born as a
consequence of our pursuing one or another of the potentially unlimited number
of alternative courses of action other than the policy at issue, including the null
option of taking no action, but who will not be conceived if the policy at issue is
implemented.11o
It is obvious that the hypothetical preferences of this second group of untold
trillions of potential but now never to be conceived future persons should not be
given any weight in a cost-benefit analysis of the policy at issue. With their very
existence at stake, each of these future persons would likely regard any specific
policy-other than the single policy that would result in their coming into
existence-as imposing immense costs upon them,"1' resulting in a very large if
not infinite aggregate cost measure for any specific policy whatsoever that
would dominate any measure of benefits that is utilized. This absurd result of
massive rejection of any course of action whatsoever (including the null option
of taking no action) indicates that it would be a category mistake to accord
standing to potential but now never to be conceived future persons in an
analysis of the consequences of a policy that necessarily precludes the existence
of those persons. The hypothetical preferences of all of those future persons
who have the potential to exist under one policy alternative or another, but
whose existence would be precluded by the specific policy measure under
conceived but not yet born at that time, as well as those members of the "transitional generations"
following the policy who were conceived after the implementation of the policy and whose genetic
identity has not yet been significantly altered by the spreading person-altering consequences of the policy.
109. By the term "future persons" I mean to refer broadly to those persons conceived after the
implementation of the policy in question whose genetic identity has been significantly altered by the
spreading person-altering consequences of the policy. For any policy there will be a transitional period
of some length during which some but not all persons born will have had their genetic identities
fundamentally altered by the person-altering consequences of the policy, before those consequences
become universal in scope. See also supra note 107.
110. It is perhaps a misnomer to refer to these wholly imaginary "beings" that never will come into
existence at all as being "persons" in any sense whatsoever, but for lack of a better descriptive phrase I
will refer to them as such.
111. This is under the assumption that offer prices, a more conservative and constrained measure of
willingness to pay, are utilized as the approach for measuring willingness to pay. These aggregate costs
would likely be infinite if asking price measures rather than offer price measures were utilized.
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consideration, should be ignored in assessing that policy's effects.' 12
But what about the first group of future persons who will be conceived and
born post-policy, for whom the policy's implementation is a necessary condition
of their existence? One would expect that at least the overwhelming majority if
not all of these future persons who would owe their very existence to the
implementation of a policy would, if given the opportunity, assign very high
offer prices 1 3 to the policy even were that policy to have some adverse or even
catastrophic consequences for their well-being. Given that these person-altering
consequences will persist for all eternity, it is of course not knowable in
advance how many future persons from each era would exist and be voting in
such a hypothetical referendum, let alone what the wealth endowment and
precise preference structure of each of these future persons that would constrain
the magnitude of their offer prices would be. It therefore will not be possible to
ascertain the distribution of the costs and benefits of a policy between existing
persons and future persons. What is clear, however, is that any policy with
person-altering consequences, no matter how broadly catastrophic its long-term
impacts, would result in truly massive benefits for those future persons 114 who
otherwise would not have been born that would completely dominate the
magnitude of any adverse impacts upon existing persons," 5 for the obvious
112. Jeffrey Gaba has insightfully likened this situation to the science fiction motif of an infinite
number of universes being generated each instant as our present decisions create multiple alternative
futures. Gaba, supra note 93, at 258 n.24. He also draws the analogy to multi-universe interpretations of
the probabilistic results of quantum physics. Id. He concludes as do I that the adverse impacts of our
policies upon this multitude of potential but now never to be conceived persons should be ignored,
though not for the reason that I give that their inclusion in the analysis would lead to absurd results, but
instead because their competing interests should be regarded as "cancelling out;" cost-benefit analysis
should in effect be "renormalized" to eliminate such infinite values in a manner that parallels what
physicists do in their quantum mechanics equations. Id.
Steven Landsburg in his recent and entertaining book, MORE SEX IS SAFER SEx (2007), also addresses
to a modest extent the question of how to value the consequences of our actions for yet-unconceived
future persons. Id. at 238-43. Landsburg recognizes that our policy choices raise moral questions with
regard to their impact upon yet-unconceived future generations ("Do we have any moral obligation to
account for the interests of trillions of potential people, who will never have the opportunity to live
unless we conceive them?"), and that these questions are of practical significance for real-world
policymaking. Id. at 243. He also recognizes the perhaps insurmountable difficulty of these questions.
Id. at 239 ("Perhaps [we should just admit] ... that we're incapable of being logically rigorous about
issues involving the unconceived."). His analysis, however, appears to regard unconceived future
persons as comprising a single large group who can either be conceived or not, depending on what
course of action we pursue, rather than recognizing that they actually constitute a vast multiplicity of
alternative groups of persons extending through time. A policy action leading to the conception of one
group would necessarily preclude the conception of all of the other groups, necessitating the develop-
ment of a framework for addressing these stark intra-group conflicts of interest were any rights for
unconceived persons to be recognized. Landsburg does not address this difficulty, and consequently
does not appear to understand the full significance of person-altering consequences for policy analysis.
113. It is also likely that infinite asking prices would be assigned if this is the willingness to pay
measure utilized.
114. This is true even using restrictive offer price measures rather than uncapped asking price
measures of these benefits.
115. 1 am assuming that future persons are psychologically similar to existing persons in this regard.
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reason that all of the untold trillions of future persons whose hypothetical
preferences are being considered would owe their very existence to the implemen-
tation of that policy. This presents a real problem for cost-benefit analysis
because any policy measure whatsoever, including the null option, will now
result in massive benefits of highly uncertain magnitude for the combined group
of existing persons and future persons when person-altering consequences are
included. Of what use, if any, would such analyses be for policymakers in
choosing among alternatives?
Consider, for example, a radically present-oriented proposal to put all of our
high-level radioactive wastes into ordinary steel barrels that will not provide
effective long-term containment and then dump them all overboard into the
Pacific Ocean." 6 This policy would free billions of dollars of resources now
devoted each year to radioactive waste storage efforts to be diverted to other
pressing social needs. While those future persons born several centuries from
now and thereafter may well suffer very significant adverse environmental
consequences from such an action, the multi-billion dollar resource realloca-
tions that such a policy would allow would have cascading person-altering
consequences that would surely be universal in scope well before those barrels
began to leak their poisons.
As previously discussed, those potential but now never to be conceived future
persons who as a result of those resource reallocations will not be born should
not be accorded standing in a cost-benefit analysis of the ocean waste dumping
policy1 17 The future persons that will be born as a consequence of that ocean
waste dumping policy would owe their very existence to it. If they could be
asked for their opinions about the policy, if they are at all like existing persons
in their psychological make-up they would surely overwhelmingly (if not
unanimously) prefer coming into existence, even if their lives involved grap-
pling with a serious radioactive waste problem, to nonexistence. They would of
course much prefer existence without the radioactive waste problem, were that
an option that could be chosen, but the central insight of the problem of
person-altering consequences is that this is not logically possible. The only
choice that those future persons would be hypothetically presented with is the
bundled Hobson's Choice of life with the radioactive waste problem or nonexist-
ence, and if they are at all like existing persons they would assign very large
benefits to the policy however those benefits are assessed.
The ocean waste dumping policy will therefore be very favorably evaluated
by a cost-benefit analysis that incorporates person-altering consequences, since
the existing persons who will surely be dead long before the wastes leak into the
environment and cause adverse biological consequences would be, on balance,
net beneficiaries of the large resource reallocations thereby made possible by
116. This particular hypothetical is analyzed in some detail in my earlier articles on the subject. See
Crespi 2008, supra note 25; Crespi 2007, supra note 25.
117. See supra note 113 and the accompanying text.
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the policy," 8 and the long parade of generations of future persons for whom the
policy is a necessary condition of their existence could be plausibly assumed to
chime in with declarations of truly massive benefits, though of very uncertain
magnitude in the aggregate. So, this ocean waste dumping policy will receive a
ringing endorsement from the cost-benefit analysis. As I have already made
clear, however, so would any other policy proposal, even those that are broadly
disfavored by existing persons, since the cost-benefit calculations would invari-
ably be dominated by the vast horde of members of distant future generations
for whom the particular policy at issue would be a necessary condition of their
existence.
The severe valuation problem posed for cost-benefit analysis by person-
altering consequences is thus squarely posed. For those untold trillions of future
persons whose identity will be affected by those consequences of a policy, the
policy is a necessary condition of their existence. Its impacts will thus be valued
very highly by those persons as against their actual alternative of nonexistence.
The conventional practice of valuing the consequences of a policy as compared
to the hypothetical baseline scenario of a world in which those same persons
would exist, but without experiencing the policy's impacts, makes no sense at
all since such an alternative scenario could not possibly occur. Willingness to
pay-based assessments of benefits for future persons that are derived in such a
fashion are completely arbitrary. Moreover, assessments so derived are not only
arbitrary but are also biased downwards, in some instances dramatically so. This
is because for some policies (suCh as the ocean waste dumping hypothetical that
I have discussed above) many future persons may strongly prefer the unattain-
able scenario in which they are presumed to still exist, but without experiencing
the impacts of the policy at issue, as compared to the world that would actually
result for them from the policy's consequences. Under this comparative frame-
work, those future persons would then likely assign net costs rather than very
large benefits to the policy's consequences, leading in the aggregate to a perhaps
massive undervaluation of the future effects of the policy as compared to its
valuation if those future persons were to assess it as against their actual
alternative of nonexistence. This approach would thus give far too much weight
to the consequences of that policy for existing persons relative to its actual
massively beneficial impacts on future persons. The current conventional ap-
proach of utilizing hypothetical baseline scenarios that ignore person-altering
consequences is fatally flawed; that much is clear.
In my opinion, the failure of cost-benefit analysts to incorporate person-
118. I concede that there may well be existing persons who empathize sufficiently with the
environmental problems that the ocean waste dumping policy may cause for the members of distant
future generations that they would regard the policy as imposing net costs on themselves, despite the
more immediate and tangible benefits that may accrue to them from the resource allocation savings.
However, I feel confident that on balance the net costs this policy would impose on these unusually
empathetic persons will be substantially outweighed by the net benefits for the large number of existing
persons whose empathetic time horizons do not span as far into the future as several centuries or more.
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altering consequences in their analyses has been primarily due to their overlook-
ing those consequences rather than deliberately choosing to ignore them. There
is apparently a general lack of familiarity among these analysts with the work of
Derek Parfit and other philosophers who have wrestled with the problem of
giving proper weight to these kinds of consequences. An argument can be made
that the use of a demonstrably unattainable hypothetical baseline reference
scenario that ignores person-altering consequences can be justified on the basis
of parallels between this endogeneity of identity situation and the lesser prob-
lem presented to cost-benefit analysis by endogenous preferences. I believe,
however, that this argument is very strained and unconvincing.
Let me explain how this analogy fails. One may attempt to characterize the
endogeneity of identity problem presented by person-altering consequences as
simply being an extreme extension of the endogenous preferences situation
discussed above in Part II, different only in magnitude and not in its essential
character. One might then seek guidance for evaluating policies with person-
altering consequences from the ideas that have been proposed for addressing the
lesser difficulties posed by endogenous preferences. However, in my. opinion,
this approach does not prove to be fruitful.
In the paradigmatic endogenous preferences situation, a group of persons
whose circumstances have been impacted by a policy have also had their
preference structures altered by the policy, although their fundamental genetic
identities are assumed to be unchanged. The question posed for cost-benefit
analysis, as discussed above in Part II of this Article, is whether those persons'
pre-policy implementation preferences or post-policy implementation prefer-
ences should be utilized to generate their willingness to pay-based cost and
benefit assessments of the policy's impacts, as compared to the reference point
of the policy not being implemented and those persons' initial circumstances
and preference structures both remaining unchanged. One could argue the
endogeneity, of identity problem may be viewed in some regards as simply an
extreme extension of the endogenous preferences problem, and thus amenable
to some of the same valuation adjustments discussed above.
.However, this analogy between the endogenous preferences and endogeneity
of identity situations is rather superficial and breaks down quickly under closer
inspection. In the paradigmatic endogenous preference situation only currently
existing persons are considered, and a choice need only be made as to which of
the two preference structures that exist at different points in time for those
persons better reflects their "true" preferences. In the endogeneity of identity
situation, in sharp contrast, the future persons involved do not exist prior to the
implementation of the policy and have only one preference structure, their
post-policy implementation preferences, that very strongly favor the policy at
issue. The use of the conventional hypothetical baseline scenario assumption,
therefore, does not merely substitute an earlier and different structure of prefer-
ences held by those persons for use in obtaining those persons' valuation of the
policy. That conventional assumption in this instance instead substitutes as the
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reference point for comparison a hypothetical factual circumstance-those per-
sons' existence but without the policy's consequences-that cannot possibly
occur and bears no relationship to those persons' preferences, earlier or later,
"true" or otherwise. The arguments made by Cass Sunstein that may justify use
of pre-policy implementation preferences to value a policy in the endogenous
preferences context, under some circumstances, obviously do not justify the use
of a demonstrably false "the same persons will exist either way" standard of
comparison in the endogeneity of identity context.
Person-altering consequences can no longer be simply ignored. But as noted,
the other horn of the dilemma is that attempting to value those person-altering
consequences in the usual willingness to pay-based manner unfortunately leads
to the cost-benefit analysis methodology "blowing up." All policy options will
now generate massive future benefits11 9 that will dominate the policies' possibly
adverse effects upon existing persons, but those future net benefits are simply
not measurable with sufficient precision to allow the alternative policy options
to be meaningfully compared and ranked.
Is there a viable middle ground here? Can we develop a willingness to
pay-based method of including person-altering consequences in cost-benefit
analysis that would lead to intuitively reasonable results and meaningful discrimi-
nation among policy alternatives? Or do we face a fundamental and insoluble
problem with the cost-benefit methodology in that person-altering consequences
cannot credibly be ignored any longer, but also cannot be meaningfully valued
in the willingness to pay-based fashion that essentially defines the cost-benefit
methodology, which may require us to discard this approach and take an
entirely new analytical tact?
This endogeneity of identity problem may well be fatal to cost-benefit
analysis. It may simply be that because of the pervasiveness and significance of
person-altering consequences, meaningful policy recommendations cannot be
formulated solely on the basis of conventional secular, consequentialist ethical
premises and their willingness to pay-based valuation corollary. We may have
little choice but to develop new assessment methodologies grounded at least
partly upon non-consequentialist normative criteria to adequately handle those
consequences. However, before endorsing such a radical change, let me first
explore a couple of alternative willingness to pay-based valuation approaches to
including person-altering consequences in cost-benefit analysis, which one may
consider in an attempt to rescue the methodology from this dilemma.
2. Consideration of Two Alternative Cost-Benefit Approaches for Valuing
Person-Altering Consequences
Let me set forth and discuss two alternative valuation approaches that would
incorporate person-altering consequences and each retain the conventional will-
119. In fact, they will clearly each result in infinite net benefits if asking price measures of
willingness to pay are utilized.
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ingness to pay valuation premise that is the very heart of the cost-benefit
methodology. One approach would be to first value all of the impacts of a policy
on the members of distant future generations-for whom it is a necessary
condition of their existence-by their estimated offer prices, rather than by their
estimated asking prices. 120 This approach would initially generate a finite-
although still very large-aggregate benefit measure, rather than an analytically
intractable infinite benefit measure. Then, discount those future benefits at a
very high discount rate-high enough so they have an aggregate present value
of essentially zero. Under this approach, the massive benefits of a policy for the
members of distant future generations-for whom it is a necessary condition of
their existence-would then be reduced to insignificance and thus not over-
whelm the effects of the policy on existing persons, which would then essen-
tially become the sole consideration in reaching a conclusion.
Let me consider this approach in more detail. First, the use of offer price
rather than asking price measures of impacts has some plausibility. Offer prices,
rather than asking prices, are now conventionally used in cost-benefit analyses
to measure both the costs and benefits of the .policy under consideration.' 21
While some observers regard this choice of valuation measures as arbitrary and
imposing a sometimes severe downward bias on the numbers thereby ob-
tained, 122 a more in-depth analysis of the question suggests that the use of offer
prices rather than asking prices can perhaps be adequately justified, at least for
benefit measures, although the question of how the cost impacts of a policy are
most appropriately measured is a much more difficult question whose proper
resolution is still uncertain 
123
The use of a very high discount rate to minimize the policy benefits for future
persons is, however, far more problematic. Most arguments offered for discount-
ing future impacts are based upon either observed rates of investor time
preference or social rates of return on invested capital and cannot plausibly
justify the use of annual discount rates higher than, at most, 10-15%.124 While
discount rates of such magnitude would reduce to relative insignificance even
very large benefits that occurred a century or more in the future, 125 they would
not prevent the person-altering consequences for the many millions of people
120. Whether offer prices or instead asking prices should be used to measure costs and benefits is a
very controversial question that I have elsewhere explored at length, see generally Crespi 2006, supra
note 17, and plausible arguments can be made for the use of offer price measures of benefits. Id. at
464-65.
121. Id. at436.
122. Id. at 445.
123. The issue of whether offer prices or instead asking prices are the most appropriate way to
measure costs and benefits is exhaustively addressed in Crespi, id., and in Korobkin, supra note 17.
124. I will not address in this Article the current debate regarding the appropriate choice of discount
rates with regard to conventional cost-benefit analyses that ignore person-altering consequences. See
generally Revesz, supra note 15.
125. For example, benefits that occurred 100 years in the future would by the use of a 10% annual
discount rate be reduced by a factor of approximately 13,740, and benefits occurring 200 years in the
future would be reduced by a factor of approximately 1,888,000!
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likely to be affected within a few years (or at most a few decades) after a
policy's implementation-given the great sensitivity of particular sperm-egg
unions to even very minor changes in the circumstances of an act of sexual
intercourse-from completely dominating the calculations. 26 Annual discount
rates in the high triple digits would probably be necessary to reduce those
nearer-term large future benefits to insignificance.
1 2 7
High triple-digit annual discount rates, however, cannot be grounded on any
plausible theory of investor time preferences or social rates of return on capital
investment, and the use of this approach to value person-altering consequences
is obviously a contrived means of nominally addressing person-altering conse-
quences in a willingness to pay-based valuation framework, while in substance
ignoring those consequences so as to avoid the paralyzing computational difficul-
ties. Moreover, this approach is perhaps even less adequate than the current
conventional approach in handling the problem of person-altering conse-
quences. The current conventional approach, as discussed above, rather than
attempting to value person-altering consequences implicitly substitutes valua-
tion of a policy's effects relative to a demonstrably unattainable baseline
scenario that ignores those consequences. The suggested offer prices/very high
discount rate alternative, in contrast, candidly recognizes the existence of
person-altering consequences as a formal matter but then proceeds to value
them at essentially zero through the high discount rate ploy. In some instances,
this zero measure of impacts upon future persons could be even less accurate
than the arbitrary measure that is obtained through the conventional approach,
under which it is quite possible to obtain a positive rather than zero aggregate
valuation of a policy's impacts on future persons relative to the hypothetical
baseline scenario. Thus, it may lead, in some cases, to an even more pronounced
bias towards radically present-oriented policies than the current approach.
Despite these shortcomings, one could argue that an approach that at least in
principle recognizes the existence of person-altering consequences, even though
it then mathematically manipulates them out of the analysis, is at least a small
,step in the right direction. Those important consequences are now not com-
pletely ignored at the outset, and the core willingness to pay-based valuation
framework has nominally been retained. However, this approach ultimately
avoids confronting the difficult valuation question in a meaningful fashion and
126. For example, benefits that occurred five years in the future would, by the use of even a 15%
annual discount rate, only be discounted by a factor of approximately two. Even those benefits that did
not occur for 30 years, by which time the person-altering consequences of almost any policy are likely
to be universal, would only be discounted by a factor of approximately 66, leaving them likely still
several orders of magnitude greater than the policy's impacts upon existing persons.
127. For example, use of a 100% annual discount rate would discount benefits that occurred five
years in the future by a factor of only 32, which would still result in the very large benefits resulting
from person-altering consequences dominating the analysis. However, an annual discount rate of, say,
700%, would lead to the discounting of such fifth-year benefits by a factor of 16,807, which might
suffice to reduce them to an aggregate level that is insignificant relative to the policy's impacts on
existing persons.
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may suffer from an even stronger bias in favor of radically present-oriented
policies than does the conventional approach. I conclude that this offer prices/
very high discount rate alternative approach is an inadequate means of modify-
ing cost-benefit analysis to incorporate person-altering consequences.
The second alternative valuation approach that I suggest for consideration
would accomplish essentially the same result, but in a more candid manner.
Under this approach, one would simply ignore all the impacts of a policy on the
members of distant future generations and consider only the benefits and costs
for existing persons.128
The basic argument for taking this approach is as follows. Those members of
distant future generations who would be conceived and born as a result of any
particular policy choice, and who understood the narrow range of logically
possible outcomes-the limited bundled choices that we face because of the
policy's person-altering consequences for future generations-would ascribe
very large benefits to that policy since it provides the necessary conditions for
their existence. But, there is no feasible way to quantify and compare the huge
aggregate benefits that would result for each of the different groups of future
persons that would be conceived and born under each of our many possible
policy options. Given this fact, perhaps it makes sense to simply ignore the
massive beneficial impacts of each policy under consideration on the particular
group of future persons that it brings into being and focus only upon the impacts
upon existing persons. 129 Those massive but practically indeterminate benefits
to those future persons who are born under each of the different possible policy
options might thus be regarded as "cancelling out" across those policy options,
in a sense.13°
This second approach-formally recognizing the existence of person-altering
consequences but then explicitly ignoring them in the valuation calculations-
is, however, also problematic. It is concededly common for conventional cost-
128. See supra note 109.
129. Id.
130. Jeffrey Gaba has argued that the very many different groups of persons whose conception and
birth would be precluded by any policy chosen from the immense set of possible alternatives should
perhaps have their interests ignored in an analysis on the basis that they "cancelled out" in the analysis.
Gaba, supra note 93. While Gaba is only referring to cancelling out the interests of those groups of
persons whose birth is precluded by the policy that is chosen, this cancelling out approach might be
extended to also ignore, in an analysis, the interests of future persons who would be born as a result of
the policy under consideration. Such a broader cancelling out approach with regard to both future
persons who will be born as a result of a policy and potential future persons whose births are precluded
by the policy has been suggested by Eric Posner:
For ordinary regulations such as environmental regulation, there will be little reason to think
there is a morally significant difference between producing the first group of people [those
born if the policy is not implemented] and producing the second group of people [those born if
the policy is implemented]. Therefore I think the two would cancel out.
Email from Eric Posner, Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, to
Gregory Crespi, Professor of Law, Dedman .School of Law, Southern Methodist University (Feb. 5,
2008, 09:05 EST) (on file with the author).
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benefit analyses to overlook impacts that the analyst cannot meaningfully
reduce to quantitative terms. For example, the diffuse psychological impacts on
persons due to their empathetic recognition of benefits conferred or costs
imposed on other persons are difficult or impossible to measure with sufficient
precision to meaningfully combine with more tangible policy impacts, and are
commonly ignored. In many instances this practice of limiting the scope of the
analysis to feasibly quantifiable impacts can be justified as a reasonable and
necessary analytical simplification on the basis that those overlooked and
practically immeasurable impacts are relatively small in magnitude relative to
the more easily measured impacts, and/or they tend to offset one another in the
aggregate, so the ultimate conclusions of the analysis are not significantly
affected by their omission.
However, person-altering consequences are very different in these regards.
First, they are huge in magnitude relative to the measurable impacts upon
existing persons, and obviously cannot be overlooked without dramatically
affecting the result of the analysis. Second, they are not internally offsetting;
virtually all future persons would likely ascribe very large net benefits to a
policy that is a necessary condition of their existence. The conventional argu-
ments offered for selectively overlooking certain difficult to quantify policy
impacts in a cost-benefit analysis, thus, do not support doing so when person-
altering consequences are involved. Another shortcoming of this approach is,
again, the downward bias problem noted above with regard to the offer prices/
very high discount rate approach. Assigning zero value to the impacts upon
future persons131 may, under some circumstances yield results that are even less
accurate than the arbitrary conclusions under the conventional approach and
could again lead to an even more pronounced bias towards radically present-
oriented policies.
As a practical matter both approaches discussed above would lead to cost-
benefit analysis policy recommendations that are based upon consideration of
only the impacts upon existing persons1 32 and ignore any impacts upon future
persons.1 33 These approaches would tip the scales even more in favor of
radically present-oriented policies that provide current benefits and whose
adverse impacts primarily occur in distant future years-such as my ocean
waste dumping policy hypothetical-and against policies that primarily result in
current costs and distant future benefits-such as measures that would impose
restrictions on fossil fuel use in an attempt to mitigate long-term global warm-
ing consequences-than does the current conventional approach.
Between these two alternative valuation approaches I marginally favor the
second approach over the first approach as at least being the more candid of the
two methods for circumventing the future effects valuation problem posed by
131. See supra note 110.
132. See supra note 109.
133. See supra note 110.
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person-altering consequences. Either approach would move the analytical ball
forward, at least marginally, by initially recognizing in principle the pervasive-
ness of person-altering consequences, and only then subsequently declining in
one fashion or another to attempt to meaningfully quantify those consequences,
rather than starting with the demonstrably false implicit assumption that such
consequences do not occur and then calculating the policy impacts on future
persons on that arbitrary basis. The more difficult question, of course, is
whether either of these ploys are sufficient to rescue cost-benefit analysis from
the difficulties posed by the problem of person-altering consequences.
Clearly the demonstrably false conventional implicit assumption that person-
altering consequences do not occur at all leads to both arbitrary results and
potentially radical undervaluation of policy impacts on future persons, and must
be discarded. But is it sufficient to salvage the cost-benefit methodology to
formally recognize that such person-altering consequences do indeed occur and
are in fact of far greater significance than all other consequences combined for
the affected future persons, but then to simply ignore them in one fashion or
another on the basis that they cannot be meaningfully quantified? I think not.
While it is perhaps a small positive step to nominally recognize the existence of
personal-altering consequences, any mode of analysis that then fails to attempt
to meaningfully quantify the impacts of those consequences for comparative
purposes cannot credibly be advanced as a comprehensive framework for
guiding policy decisions. What you would get from such new valuation ap-
proaches, such as those I have just discussed, is what the noted cost-benefit
scholar E.J. Mishan has colorfully labeled "horse and rabbit stew," an unappeal-
ing concoction which retains its equine flavor no matter how carefully the rabbit
is chosen for its taste.134 For each of these approaches, the "horse" would be an
overwhelmingly strong orientation to favor radically present-oriented policies
that generate benefits for existing persons, regardless of the magnitude of their
later adverse impacts on future persons, and to disfavor any future-oriented
policy that imposed net sacrifices on existing persons. To many persons this
radical present-orientation would be just as unacceptable a feature of a policy
evaluation framework as is the current practice of simply ignoring person-
altering consequences through the use of demonstrably false baseline valuation
assumptions.
Things do not look good for the continued viability of cost-benefit analysis.
Moreover, there is a further difficulty that would have to be faced even if
measuring techniques for quantifying person-altering consequences could some-
how be much improved. Assume for a moment that it were possible to develop
plausible willingness to pay-based estimates of the magnitude of the person-
altering consequences of policies, of the very large benefits for distant future
generations that would result from each of the policies under consideration, so
that these policies could then be meaningfully compared and ranked in an
134. MisHAN, supra note 2, at 160-62.
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inclusive manner that incorporated those consequences. A fundamental bias
would still remain, this time a radically future-oriented bias. Even minor dif-
ferences in the relative size of the very large estimates of the future net benefits
for the various policy options, even if discounted at relatively (though not
implausibly) high discount rates, would in all likelihood completely dominate
any differences among the policies with regard to their net impacts on existing
persons. The cost-benefit analysis recommendations would then be made solely
on the basis of which policy option created the greatest benefits for future
persons. The preferences of all existing persons taken together would have
essentially no weight in the decision.
Making important policy decisions without regard to the preferences of any
or even all existing persons is a bizarre and absurd idea. So even if the
magnitude of the person-altering consequences of different policies could some-
how be meaningfully measured and compared in cost-benefit analyses they
would still provide unhelpful results and recommendations. This conclusion
further highlights the weaknesses of the willingness to pay valuation criterion
that underlies cost-benefit analysis with regard to assessing person-altering
consequences. I am forced to conclude that there are no easy fixes; cost-benefit
analysis is simply no longer a credible analytical approach once person-altering
consequences are recognized. We have little choice but to develop new and
broader normative criteria that also incorporate a broader range of secular but
non-consequentialist ethical premises, or even overtly theistic premises, in a
manner that will allow for meaningful recognition of the person-altering conse-
quences of policies. By definition, however, any analytical approach that gave
any weight at 411 to policy consequences apart from their effects on specific
future persons as measured by willingness to pay principles could no longer
be considered to be "cost-benefit analysis" as that phrase is conventionally
understood.
3. Developing Alternative Criteria for Assessing the Impacts of Person-Altering
Consequences
Let me offer a few preliminary thoughts as to how the significance of a
policy's effects on future generations might be assessed in a manner that is not
linked to the willingness to pay of specific individuals, but which still allows for
quantitative aggregation with a willingness to pay-based assessment of the
consequences for existing persons that has been derived through a conventional
cost-benefit analysis. None of the alternative lines of inquiry that I will suggest
appear to me to be particularly promising, but we nevertheless need to come up
with some new assessment techniques, so more efforts along these or other lines
are definitely called for.
I will not attempt to offer or comment upon any theistically-based valuation
criteria. To the extent that one or more of the mainstream religious traditions
provide sufficiently precise guidance as to how to ascertain and quantify the.
consequences of policies for future generations, apart from the estimated willing-
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ness to pay to enjoy or avoid those consequences of specific future individuals,
such approaches may provide acceptable policy assessment techniques for those
persons who embrace those particular traditions. However, let me briefly note
that theistic criteria may well not embrace the sharp dichotomy between policy
impacts that will affect existing persons and those temporally more distant im-
pacts that will affect only future persons. They may, therefore, call into question
the use of willingness to pay-based valuations of the impacts of policies upon
existing persons as part of an overall assessment methodology. I will here only
address the possibility of developing new secular valuation criteria that differ
from conventional cost-benefit valuations that are based upon the willingness to
pay of specific individuals, and that could be used to value in quantitative terms
policy impacts upon future persons and would thus allow for mathematical
aggregation of those valuations with the conventional willingness to pay-based
valuations of policy impacts upon existing persons.
As a threshold matter, it is clear that any attempt to value a policy's impacts
upon future persons in a willingness to pay-based manner with reference to any
hypothetical baseline scenario other than the actual alternative of those persons'
non-existence would be subject to the same devastating criticisms made of the
current practice of utilizing a demonstrably unattainable baseline reference
scenario that assumes that those same persons would exist but would not
experience the policy's impacts. Some other tact will have to be taken. There
appear to be three possible lines of inquiry with regard to the development of a
secular valuation criterion that is not grounded in their estimated willingness to
pay of specific future persons.
One possibility would be to continue to focus upon policy impacts upon
specific future persons, but value those impacts through some methodology
other than those persons' willingness to pay to enjoy or avoid policy conse-
quences. A second possibility would be to develop a different consequentialist
valuation criterion that focused upon policy consequences other than the im-
pacts upon specific future individuals. The third possibility would be to take an
explicitly non-consequentialist approach, and somehow assign a numerical
value to each policy option without regard to its consequences. Under each of
these approaches, the valuation thereby derived would then have to be aggre-
gated with the subject policy's willingness to pay-based valuations with regard
to its impacts upon existing persons in order to obtain an overall policy
assessment.
This first tact does not appear to be a very fruitful approach. Each policy
option, because of its person-altering consequences, will lead to a different
population of future individuals over a very extended period of time. The
chosen criterion would have to be able to quantify the effects of each policy for
each of the members of each of the relevant immense population groups. The
same seemingly insurmountable problem of measurement uncertainty that would
plague attempts to meaningfully compare the relative impacts of policies under
the willingness to pay-based criterion, when person-altering consequences are
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taken into account, would therefore exist here as well, unless that new valuation
criterion, through its time discounting approach or otherwise, accorded only
minimal significance to policy impacts upon future persons as compared to the
impacts upon existing persons. But if it did so, it would again, as do the two
willingness to pay-based alternatives that I have discussed in the prior subsec-
tion of this Article, consistently favor radically present-oriented policies. It
would likely be widely regarded as unacceptable on that basis alone.
The second possible analytical move would be to attempt to value the
impacts of policies on future generations by a different consequentialist crite-
rion that does not consider impacts upon specific future persons as one of the
relevant consequences. There is a modest literature that has begun to explore the
use of such alternative consequentialist policy evaluation criteria, and I have
summarized and discussed that work in an earlier article that focused on the
ethical implications of the problem of person-altering consequences. 135 That
literature, however, unfortunately has some rather severe shortcomings and
limitations.
First, those writers have focused primarily upon establishing the ethical
underpinnings that might justify recognizing such a consequentialist obligation
to future generations that is not grounded in the impacts upon specific future
individuals. They have not, however, yet attempted the far more difficult
undertaking of proposing and defending a valuation algorithm by which the
extent to which a policy implicates such an obligation could be quantified for
aggregation with the willingness to pay-based impacts of the policy upon
existing persons. On what possible basis could meaningful numbers be assigned
to the discharge (or violation) of such impersonal obligations that do not run to
specific individuals?
Second, and more importantly, that literature is unconvincing on its own
135. Crespi 2007, supra note 25, at 10881-84. Scholars who have made contributions to this inquiry
include, among others, Anthony D'Amato, Edith Brown Weiss, Lothar Gundling, Michael Laudnor,
William Grey, Rahul Kumar, and Doran Smolkin. Id. at 10883-84. One tact some of these writers-have
suggested is to define some sort of "rights" for future persons to not be burdened with overly adverse
consequences, even if those consequences are logically necessary conditions of their existence, and
then incorporate respect for those rights in some fashion in policy deliberations. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra
note 93; Smolkin, supra note 89. Another possible approach is to define various collective groups of
persons as morally significant entities that have both rights and interests, such as specific future
generations or even the "human race" as a whole, apart from the specific individuals that comprise
those groups, and then assign values to impacts upon those entities. For arguments that have been made
along these lines, see, e.g., Kyser, supra note 7, at 37-38 ("[Olne promising mechanism for doing so is
to conceive of the 'communities which future persons belong to [as] deserving of concern and respect
in their own right."'); Weiss, supra note 89, at 203-205 (referring to "group rights, as distinct from
individual rights" that create a duty grounded in "planetary, or intergenerational rights [that] are not
rights possessed by individuals."); Gundling, supra note 89, at 207 (same); D'Amato, supra note 89, at
197-198 ("[iut is somehow wrong to despoil the environment.., even when we cannot calculate how
such acts would make any present or future persons worse off."). See also Michael Laudnor, In Defense
of Wrongful Life: Bringing Political Theory to the Defense of a Tort, 62 FoRD)HAM L. REv. 1675,
1679-80 (1994); William Grey, Possible Persons and the Problems of Posterity, 5 ENVTL. VALUES 161,
168-172 (1996); Rahul Kumar, Who Can Be Wronged?, 31 PHaL & PUB. AFF. 99, 116-117 (2003).
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terms even as to the threshold ethical criterion that it posits. Those writers
generally argue in one fashion or another that such an obligation is grounded in
an impersonal duty to the human race as a whole. These arguments in turn
implicitly rest upon the view that the human race meaningfully exists in a moral
sense apart from the individuals that comprise it. 136 However, the human race is
comprised only of the specific individuals who come into existence over time,
and to endorse a particular policy option as the preferred alternative on human
race-enhancing grounds, so to speak, would simply serve to privilege one group
of potential future persons who would be brought into existence under that
policy over the vast multitude of other groups of persons who would be con-
ceived and born under each of the virtually infinite number of policy alterna-
tives. It is most unclear how this privileged group would be selected, and how
the net benefits to this group would then be quantified under such a criterion for
aggregation with the willingness to pay-based impacts of policies upon existing
persons.
The third possible tact would be to abandon altogether the attempt to formu-
late a consequentialist valuation criterion, and simply ignore policy impacts on
specific future persons for valuation purposes, and instead assess the extent to
which each policy option conforms with the chosen non-consequentialist ethical
criterion. Examples of such criteria would be the nature of the motives of the
policymaker with regard to their degree of altruistic concern for the welfare of
future generations, or the degree to which each policy option evidences a
Kantian aversion to imposing uncompensated harms on future persons without
their consent. Such a non-consequentialist valuation approach also appears to
me to be unpromising, however, partly because of the obvious difficulties posed
in reaching a consensus as to the appropriate criterion, and partly because I
frankly cannot even imagine how such a criterion could then ever be quantified
in application so as to render its valuations of a policy commensurate with the
policy's willingness to pay-based impacts upon existing persons.
D. Conclusions Regarding the Problem of Endogeneity of Identity
Cost-benefit analysis is a widely used and highly influential analytical -tech-
nique to evaluate policies on the basis of their consequences for affected
persons, as measured by those persons' willingness to pay to enjoy or to avoid
those consequences. The recent work of Derek Parfit and other philosophers,
however, has made it clear that any social policy undertaken will trigger an
exponentially cascading series of genetic alterations in subsequently-conceived
persons that will eventually lead to the existence for all eternity of an entirely
different group of future persons than those people that would have existed had
the policy not been implemented. In other words, all policies have pervasive,
eventually universal, and eternal person-altering consequences of overwhelming
136. Crespi 2007, supra note 25, at 10884 (citing extensively to the literature that takes this
position).
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significance relative to the other policy impacts. If cost-benefit analysis is to
provide comprehensive and unbiased policy making guidance it will clearly
need to take those consequences into account in some appropriate fashion.
Current cost-benefit analysts essentially ignore these person-altering conse-
quences by implicitly assuming that policies will not have such consequences;
that the hypothetical future persons whose valuations of policies are being
estimated are the exact same persons who would exist absent the implementa-
tion of those policies. This demonstrably false assumption simply ignores the
fact that these person-altering consequences are to the affected persons the most
significant impact by far of the policies at issue, and any policy recommenda-
tions that are derived from incomplete and biased analyses that overlook these
consequences are simply not relevant to the actual choices at hand. If one
attempts to address this problem by incorporating person-altering consequences
into cost-benefit analysis in the usual willingness to pay-based fashion that is
the core premise of that approach, however, one reaches unhelpful results. All
policies then generate truly massive future benefits of very uncertain magnitude,
making it impossible to meaningfully discriminate among alternatives either
with regard to their different future effects or with regard to the different
trade-offs they present between current impacts and future effects.
There unfortunately does not appear to be an answer to this conundrum
within the willingness to pay-based valuation framework of welfare economics
upon which cost-benefit analysis is grounded. Continuing to ignore person-
altering consequences by valuing the future effects of policies with regard to
conceptually unattainable baseline scenarios that implicitly assume away those
beneficial consequences to the affected persons will continue to lead to biased
policy recommendations of a radically present-oriented character, and is there-
fore unacceptable. But there does not appear to be any way to meaningfully
incorporate these person-altering consequences into the analysis and also avoid
reaching the counterintuitive and unhelpful sweeping conclusion that any policy
under consideration, whatever it may be, would result in massive benefits to
future persons of uncertain magnitude that would greatly outweigh any adverse
effects on existing persons. Attempts to avoid this result within the willingness
to pay valuation framework through the use of discount rate manipulations, or
through simply refusing to assign values to person-altering consequences, are
evasive and unconvincing.
We appear to have little choice but to abandon cost-benefit analysis as it is
now conducted. Moreover, any governmental decision-making approach whatso-
ever that limits itself to focusing upon policy consequences for specific persons,
however those consequences are measured, is subject to essentially the same
difficulties as is cost-benefit analysis with regards to assessing person-altering
consequences. 137 We therefore need to try to develop broader normative criteria
that are more inclusive in scope than merely considering policy consequences
137. I am indebted to Eric Posner for this insight. Posner, supra note 130.
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for specific persons, and that will then allow analysts to meaningfully incorpo-
rate person-altering consequences into their assessments yet still provide policy
recommendations that are both helpful and intuitively reasonable.
This will be a very difficult undertaking, to say the least, given the fundamen-
tal disagreements in this area. In particular, several very difficult questions are
presented. Can a different consequentialist criterion be developed that focuses
on consequences other than those that affect specific existing individuals? If
not, then which if any non-consequentialist secular or theistic criteria might be
appropriate to use as primary or at least supplementary normative standards for
social policy making?13 8 If some such alternative non-consequentialist criteria
are to be used, then what quantitative weight should then be given to those
criteria relative to the willingness to pay-based impacts upon specific individu-
als? These questions are indeed daunting, but the problem posed by person-
altering consequences for policy analysis must somehow be addressed.
III. CONCLUSION
Cost-benefit analysis has long been subject to both external and internal
criticisms. Notwithstanding these criticisms, it currently plays a crucial role in
American public sector decision-making. Given this fact, it is important that
such analyses be done as well as possible.
Prior critics of cost-benefit analysis have noted many of its shortcomings, but
they have largely overlooked the fact that analysts implicitly assume that both
the preferences of existing persons and the genetic identity of the members of
future generations are exogenous, that is, unaffected by the policies that are
being considered. This assumption is rarely if ever justified part of these
analyses, and many analysts may even be unaware that their work rests on these
unexamined premises. But as discussed above preferences are often to some
significant extent endogenous with regard to the policies being pursued. If so,
this leads to significant complications regarding the proper choice among the
different preference structures to utilize for the valuation calculations. An
unreflective utilization by an analyst of the pre-policy preference structures,
under an erroneous exogenous preferences assumption that presumes that those
preference structures persist indefinitely, may then lead to significant error.
In addition, the fundamental genetic identity of the members of future
generations is invariably endogenous with regard to the policies that we pursue.
A cost-benefit analysis that assumes that genetic identity is exogenous, and thus
overlooks the pervasive and eventually universal and eternal person-altering
consequences of the policy under consideration, will lead to results and recom-
mendations that are simply irrelevant to the real choices at hand.
I have considered in this article both the endogenous preferences problem and
138. See supra note 135 and the accompanying text. I personally find these arguments to be most
unconvincing in establishing meaningful additional criteria for evaluating policies that can be meshed
in some plausible fashion with the assessments of policy effects on specific future persons.
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the endogeniety of identity problem. With regard to the former problem, my
main conclusion is that when preferences are to some extent endogenous with
regard to the policy under consideration then cost-benefit analysis valuations
should be derived solely from the post-policy implementation preferences, as a
general matter. If there are any transitional preferences structures that precede
the final, stable post-policy implementation preferences, then they should be
used to value those policy consequences that occur while they are in existence.
However, this theoretically appropriate valuation framework may need to be
modified at times as discussed above to accommodate preference structure
estimation difficulties, and to counter potential analyst bias, particularly with
regard to cost-benefit analyses that are conducted prospectively rather than
retrospectively.
The endogeniety of identity problem presents a much greater challenge. The
current use of the demonstrably false implicit assumption that the genetic
identity of the members of future generations is exogenous with regard to the
policy under consideration is untenable. Since all policies have pervasive and
eventually universal person-altering consequences, the results and recommenda-
tions derived from this exogeniety of identity assumption will massively under-
state the benefits to future generations as measured by those persons' hypothetical
willingness to pay for-policy consequences. But it does not appear that this
problem can be meaningfully addressed within the secular, consequentialist
framework of welfare economics and cost-benefit analysis that underlies the use
of the willingness to pay-based valuation methodology.
It may therefore be necessary to replace or at least supplement the cost-
benefit analysis methodology with a policy assessment approach for policy
impacts affecting the members of future generations that rests upon non-
consequential ethical premises, either of a secular or theistic character, and to
develop a valuation algorithim that then can translate such a non-consequential-
ist assessment of the merits of a policy into a dollar figure that can be
aggregated with a conventionally-derived willingness to pay-based assessment
of that policy's consequences for existing persons. These are each daunting
prospects, but the severe problem posed for cost-benefit analysis by the endogeni-
ety of identity can no longer be overlooked and must somehow be addressed.
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